Steal this Movie

Automatically Bypassing DRM Protection in Streaming Media Services

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Digital Rights Management

How DRM works



DRM bypasses

- What for?



- Solution-specific
  - DeCSS - DVD Jon
  - Despotify
  - HDCP master key leaking
- Analog loophole

How DRM works



Automatic attacking

Challenges

- Complexity

- Performance

- Generality

Intuitions



Final goal:
Identify the decrypted stream and dump it!

Overview

- MovieStealer design & optimizations
- Experimental results
- Countermeasures
- Ethics and legality

MovieStealer Design

Approach overview

Goal: find the decrypted stream!


Loop detection


Buffer detection


Data-paths


Statistical analysis


Dumping & rebuilding

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Loop detection (1)

- Based on LoopProf*



**LoopProf: Dynamic Techniques for Loop Detection and Profiling*, T Moseley, et al.

Loop detection (2)

- Handling unrolled loops



BBLs accessing the same buffer with similar patterns



Loop and call-path

```
void crypto_loop(const char *key, void *in, void *out,
                 int len);

void encrypt() {
    crypto_loop("key", dec, enc, len);
}

void decrypt() {
    crypto_loop("key", enc, dec, len);
}
```

Approach review

Goal: find the decrypted stream!

Loop detection

Buffer detection

Data-paths

Statistical analysis

Dumping & rebuilding

Buffer detection

- Reason about buffers based on access patterns
  - Consecutive bytes
  - Inconsecutive blocks







Approach review

Goal: find the decrypted stream!

Loop detection

Buffer detection

Data-paths

Statistical analysis

Dumping & rebuilding

Data-paths

Identify *paths* through a loop which modify the input data to output data

A sensible data-path, find it!



Approach review

Goal: find the decrypted stream!


Loop detection


Buffer detection


Data-paths


Statistical analysis


Dumping & rebuilding



Statistical analysis (1)

- Cipher-text indistinguishability
  - Basic requirement for secure cryptosystems

- Entropy should be pretty high, as data is from Internet

Statistical analysis (2)

Stage	Input		Output	
	Entropy	Randomness	Entropy	Randomness
Download	↑	↑	↑	↑
Decrypt	↑	↑	↑	↓
Decode	↑	↓	↓	↓

Approach review

Goal: find the decrypted stream!

Loop detection

Buffer detection

Data-paths

Statistical analysis

Dumping & rebuilding

Dumping and reconstruction



* Intentionally omitted

Workflow


Start playing the video
Make *MovieStealer* begin analysis
Wait for a few minutes
Harvest

MovieStealer Optimizations

Problem of the basic approach

- Too much overhead!

- Won’t sniff enough data
- Media players don’t function normally
- Some media players check the performance
- Might get caught by checking systems of DRM

Optimizations

Goal: minimize overheads!

- Improved loop selection
- Efficient loop analysis
- On-Demand instrumentation
- Execution frequency
- Instruction analysis
- Bandwidth filtering
- Copying optimizations
- **Callstack key**

on_enter
callstack_key ^= func_addr

on_exit
callstack_key ^= func_addr

Callstack key

```
void crypto_loop(const char *key, void *in, void *out,
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on_enter
callstack_key ^= func_addr
on_exit
callstack_key ^= func_addr

Experimental Results

Implementation

- Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI)
  - Intel PIN framework
- Under Windows 7 32-bit
- Testing
  - A common workstation

Evaluation

- *GnuPG* for testing optimizations



- Three DRM platforms
  - *Microsoft PlayReady (Netflix)*
  - *Adobe RTMPE (Hulu and Amazon Video)*
  - *Spotify*'s music protection

Results - GPG

Optimizations	Loops Instrumented	Seconds Elapsed
Only execution frequency	40	3480 (112x)
Only bandwidth filtering	35	180 (5.8x)
Only instruction analysis	10	49 (1.58x)
All but callstack key	6	47 (1.51x)
All enabled	7	31



Results - DRM

Platform	Protection	Loops Instrumented	Loops Traced	Buffers Identified	Seconds Elapsed*
Netflix	*Dynamic code*	2274	58	80	110
Hulu	-	1529	46	14	281
Amazon Video	-	1258	35	6	146
Spotify	*Packing and self-checking*	2305	224	60	536

* seconds elapsed before MovieStealer breaks the DRM protection

Countermeasures

Countermeasures

- Attack the instrumentation
  - Anti-debugging
- Attack the loop detection
  - VM'ing those loops
- Attack the buffer detection
  - Non-consecutive buffer layouts
- Anti-piracy
  - Watermarking

Ethics and Legality

Ethics

- Responsible disclosure
  - Contacted Microsoft, Spotify, Adobe, Amazon, Netflix, and Hulu
  - Microsoft, Spotify, and Adobe responded
    - Tested MovieStealer
    - Confirmed DRM bypass
    - Provided comments and encouraged publication
- Some details omitted (*e.g. reconstruction*)
- No tool/source release

Legality

- We believe this work to be legal under DMCA
  - Consulted with UC counsel and the EFF
  - Thank you all

Acknowledgement

- Thanks for support from Microsoft, Adobe, and Spotify

- Thanks Kevin Borgolte, Yanick Fratantonio, Christian Kreibich, and Thorsten Holz for presentation advice

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Question time

Questions?