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let's meet assembly of Sam's pH recently

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if you took notes it's a warning some

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people referred Mary tab every verses to

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take unfortunate what is known as

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musician you have chosen to learn how to

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make Moosic yourself with this we're

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going to teach you how to play that's

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how the cowbell is a rewarding

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instrument to mask his wonderful

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percussive instrument has many

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traditions but you'll find decision to

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vote the first time you learn the proper

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way to plan travel to start with here

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are two examples of how you not so hold

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out your hand is shown here nothing too

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clogged your hand like so think of an

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eagle's claw

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that's it doesn't reinsert the showering

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of Aqaba into position and squeaks to

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the funeral taps to make sure the table

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was secure

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are you still holding the table you've

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done it you cannot properly hold it out

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there are a number of positions you can

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regulate this is called

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seated position popular because it

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provides adequate spinal support a

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cardinal player some players the first

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standing position prone position is a

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somewhat unorthodox way that favoured by

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Germans

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this position which is very popular

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these days the one was Bruce Dickinson

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this position by the position that both

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comfortable for you and will begin first

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he must find ignored with a compass

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modern science has proven that a cowbell

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found its best when facing position or

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if you're facing another direction the

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mainland was a significant drop off the

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body of a table outside the drums would

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usually the native wood is used to

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strengthen ever be happiness for one day

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America we however recommend starting

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with a normal dose let's begin play

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we'll start out with our very record

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piece of news know where the player

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chooses to add to town yeah see how

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fitting the cowbell can be it adds that

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little extra bit of magic to in use this

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time modern news here's the song without

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the presence of happened with the Kappa

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be sure to play along at home

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[Music]

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[Music]

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excellent now you're on your way to

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playing acaba remember practice makes

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birth

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it said if you've learned a lot about

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someone by walking a mile in his shoes

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the same is true for acaba accepted cabo

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has no shoes or Phoenix

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so simply learn by walking a mile and

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playing your how about senior found that

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you too can master that how will hon you

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want to hear - Pablo more and more okay

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good morning and be joyful jus soli

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[Music]

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with us well we are 60% of their farmers

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we had talked about organizations that

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take your security seriously or actually

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Democrats a little bit account so

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anybody under the age of 18 in the room

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show of hands or you said okay now we

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carry the parental advisory in this sir

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we've taken every consideration here we

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included the energies of the majors for

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activations the Bible is wearing in here

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we need to say this because I'm the

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girl's mother professionals mara will

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serve things we've got some contentious

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perhaps controversial subjects to talk

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about my language will be stripping

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contest sorry that yeah so okay so thank

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you

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I might upset local Twitter muted by

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many I lead a team of reinforced at

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professionals at work for an ISP South

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Florida

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sure I'm sure

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so I believe secured engineer and a

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security company

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I was the curly D or Scotland chapter

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many deal with applications journey and

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you know a spirit fatherhood false or

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pentas partners we hacked love stuff

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[Music]

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do you carry baseball bat but watch out

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for that and yet I also run definitely a

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school so that's how we can defy school

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it's in Glasgow it said that I started

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bungee we have said very sick or sixty

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percent of a harness there are two of

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the Memphis you don't have been after is

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in Belgium so he's busy doing that where

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we go hello yeah he joins the blades we

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were five pieces that police athletes

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genuine Annie informed from show hands

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and we know that guys follow a dog he's

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no relation to Donald we did once try

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and tell me he was a cousin but I think

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that was trying to get something and

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he's really prison in Dublin so watch it

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we can't be can't join us that's a joke

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he's on business it doubly rum-running

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don't know you can follow us on Twitter

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individually you can follow the bear

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files on Twitter

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we're pretty busy shitposting most the

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time for

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hidden amongst all the share posting

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will I think there are some valuable

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nuggets of information we do get

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involved into quite serious topics so

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that's what we're gonna talk about today

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okay

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we brought some swag with us we brought

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some critics that know specially

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laser-etched with our name and our motto

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as their farmers here Pheebs we've got

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some cowbells because we're all out

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cowbells we've got stickers

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productive but they're cool how much

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here and we also got some some fridge

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magnets which yeah cool now we're not

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sure how to distribute this swag when

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we're sure how we're not going to do it

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which is how we get leads which was to

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throw around it wasn't great yeah so

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we'll probably sling it all here and at

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the end you can come and help yourselves

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it's limited supply but first compass

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because I'm not going to try it's gonna

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kill somebody we don't we don't have

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enough money for anything okay

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who's that guy also known as grass so

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anybody alive when code jumpers on TV

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show has five days dead I feel that this

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stuff looks fairly dead he was a famous

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American TV show detective and he had a

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saying his catchphrase was who loves you

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baby and so who takes of security

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seriously whether it will be a example

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right okay I was surprised who wasn't in

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a yahoo day of reach show answer yeah so

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yeah not simply I was Yahoo a lost quite

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all the data since 2012 possibly

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beforehand but you look at the numbers

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of that we're talking 450,000 that's a

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high number twenty-two million five

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hundred five hundred million

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now 500 million will just pick on that

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2014 the Russian FSB Ballmer known as

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the KGB hire the Canadian figures

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Estonian guy eliminated drill to capture

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some high-value targets like five

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high-value targets that were American

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politicians that we usually Yahoo so you

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send and receive comprehensive

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government plus the skimming and so

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rather than take the trouble to try and

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access these five individual accounts

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the hacker concerned just took

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everybody's account put in mind that

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first of that time now published number

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was 500 million records the actual

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number that the industry thinks is 1.5

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billion records which is why that's

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clever Greenhills was involved in that

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bridge Thomson get access to find

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mailboxes a lot of data so it's not

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really I think expire safe that yahoo

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has failed they're busily say that you

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stewart seriously and even though this

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guy's so I lifted that line from that

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website they have top rate secure images

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back raid military-grade grade

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and ways to help protect you and you may

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or you use Facebook that's actually a

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crow on that on their primitive page on

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the website I'm not entirely sure they

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do you know okay

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so there's a defender booking Mark

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Zuckerberg in from the Congress at the

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back end last year talking really

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not give it much away in terms of what

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they were doing to protect you security

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or your privacy and the numbers kind of

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stuck out there we're about six million

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records in 2013 15 million records there

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anybody recognizing that number will

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recognize it from being the can merge a

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política 30 breach which was more than a

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bridge she was complete scandal of

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collusion between Facebook a private

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organization with political bias that

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was using your neck of anatomists from

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an app that many users of innocently

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installed in Facebook to understand what

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your political persuasions were going to

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be you know answer sorry you with

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marketing flattering to particular or

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all organizations and that was used

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allegedly in the pro leave campaign

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around brexit it was also used Headley

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to influence American voting again

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allegedly in the USA it's part of the

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trope that just have an interest not an

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interest useful it has the Facebook yet

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a few show of hands

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it's about somebody threatened

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exactly but lots and lots of numbers

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again in Atlanta called a desert that

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will take people's privacy seriously

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that's just absolute

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there's no evidence to support that they

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do that because the data the leaking

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supports it the number of times and look

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about ill people in the Congress

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apologize for something diamonds is

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about that actually institutionally

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Facebook is failing to take your

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security seriously but here are another

234
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couple of things about Facebook they've

235
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been to be quite cool with hate speech

236
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you know you turn Facebook on and you'll

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see somebody that's retweeted something

238
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that's quite disgusting yeah

239
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not retweeted it spits we three bulls

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we've faced I'm sorry my apologies share

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some things that would arts warehouse

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right if politically subversive activity

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so we're seeing that so we see we see

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Bachman has been creating across all

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social media that constantly posting

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stuff there's flattering to political

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organizations and again the Cambridge

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gentleman athletic your example

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demonstrates that right so much has

250
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anybody reported somebody on Facebook or

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something they're not quick to react

252
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today that they're very slow I was

253
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receiving personal abuse from somebody

254
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actual real person a long time ago

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I only evidence had all nephews except

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your simple although at Facebook and

257
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that person's still operating on flights

258
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it I think it wasn't until several other

259
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people would report the Facebook quietly

260
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deserved account it's not not but

261
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ultimately and now he's got a little

262
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quip about this you know there won't

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happen if they're carrying a security

264
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above them on happy to monetize and

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presence on that platform you have a

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problem I know yeah

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yeah yeah we're perhaps this hey if the

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platform is free you are the product

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it's the same for all social medias a

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4-lane tendencies import where's the

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same for Facebook is same for amigo

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easily yes free you can you get you take

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it so this is a sacrum videos also it is

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healthy as well did not think of the

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 videos so yeah ii think that's me I

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was fine as well within that right

277
00:13:51,460 --> 00:14:01,450
wait yeah oh yeah okay we're coming up

278
00:13:58,390 --> 00:14:04,660
with you so last video but they know for

279
00:14:01,450 --> 00:14:13,870
the border before we play anyway we're

280
00:14:04,660 --> 00:14:17,380
all Scottish music ocean sounds - I'm

281
00:14:13,870 --> 00:14:19,840
not from Dundee I'm Cosby G I'm from

282
00:14:17,380 --> 00:14:22,000
Edinburgh so I'm from Scotland now sure

283
00:14:19,840 --> 00:14:24,910
stones got it no I know but wait till we

284
00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:28,630
do let it roll I don't know Sheila and

285
00:14:24,910 --> 00:14:34,600
you live south of Edinburgh Dona so what

286
00:14:28,630 --> 00:14:36,220
well scoffs right I just talked to a

287
00:14:34,600 --> 00:14:38,770
piece victims just I sell shoes and

288
00:14:36,220 --> 00:14:40,840
dances and stuff and get some light up

289
00:14:38,770 --> 00:14:43,840
some energy because and then all

290
00:14:40,840 --> 00:14:46,270
computer on and then before I get in top

291
00:14:43,840 --> 00:14:48,280
dispensable and thanks and Hartman

292
00:14:46,270 --> 00:14:50,890
didn't touch it pop use use from all my

293
00:14:48,280 --> 00:14:53,199
diocese will t be honest I think I'm PC

294
00:14:50,890 --> 00:14:55,990
Alan see pastor soldier the bothers me

295
00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:59,890
for aperitif at home all this is just go

296
00:14:55,990 --> 00:15:01,450
up here at home I like likes cats like

297
00:14:59,890 --> 00:15:04,120
that this you need monkeys hardened

298
00:15:01,450 --> 00:15:06,460
accordions and you know I don't know why

299
00:15:04,120 --> 00:15:12,370
I'm getting ahead of us will be deleted

300
00:15:06,460 --> 00:15:14,200
my fault and many people who are

301
00:15:12,370 --> 00:15:16,870
stealing all the intelligence well their

302
00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:19,540
other sees nothing mean everything my

303
00:15:16,870 --> 00:15:22,990
back I just I just like very good not

304
00:15:19,540 --> 00:15:25,500
and now rusev and I guess your fault

305
00:15:22,990 --> 00:15:29,160
some of the individual topics and

306
00:15:25,500 --> 00:15:31,800
and everybody Bonnie basta and rooibos

307
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:35,240
so make cement to be your whole just

308
00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:35,240
Hwang kyo-ahn

309
00:15:37,210 --> 00:15:45,510
[Music]

310
00:15:39,290 --> 00:15:47,400
whole tree was at me said on this big

311
00:15:45,510 --> 00:15:50,240
contribution slide that but only

312
00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:52,079
countries not like that it works so well

313
00:15:50,240 --> 00:16:04,100
so here we have a current situation

314
00:15:52,080 --> 00:16:06,930
where this is why I'm store Facebook

315
00:16:04,100 --> 00:16:12,810
that image was supposed to buy an eye on

316
00:16:06,930 --> 00:16:15,000
Facebook thank you a so use case I found

317
00:16:12,810 --> 00:16:17,430
it so there you go

318
00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:18,210
but you know what this is kind of what

319
00:16:17,430 --> 00:16:22,439
people are thinking

320
00:16:18,210 --> 00:16:25,080
so Facebook it is evil look by an evil

321
00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:27,930
guy with evil intent evil organization

322
00:16:25,080 --> 00:16:30,000
it just wakes likes that's our we cast

323
00:16:27,930 --> 00:16:33,630
three cats we not got monkeys playing

324
00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:35,580
audience and there is no there is zero

325
00:16:33,630 --> 00:16:36,990
that the trustee the organ in the

326
00:16:35,580 --> 00:16:39,840
organization the platforming the

327
00:16:36,990 --> 00:16:44,640
technology anybody think it needs

328
00:16:39,840 --> 00:16:46,050
regulating I properly regulating social

329
00:16:44,640 --> 00:16:49,470
media generally okay

330
00:16:46,050 --> 00:16:51,089
Enoch Shores and then going back for

331
00:16:49,470 --> 00:16:54,390
short spike for a few minutes ago

332
00:16:51,090 --> 00:16:56,130
who on the back room who was previously

333
00:16:54,390 --> 00:16:58,770
at the Facebook users on the back of the

334
00:16:56,130 --> 00:17:01,220
scandal and date leaks and a lot deleted

335
00:16:58,770 --> 00:17:04,650
in probably sure half the people that

336
00:17:01,220 --> 00:17:06,360
not too many how much there has a place

337
00:17:04,650 --> 00:17:10,580
where we can go out that's when

338
00:17:06,359 --> 00:17:13,290
beginning a lot of people still early

339
00:17:10,579 --> 00:17:14,970
Egypt but unless you think maybe a bit

340
00:17:13,290 --> 00:17:16,889
like idea that you he was set for your

341
00:17:14,970 --> 00:17:18,270
own threat on right and if you step on

342
00:17:16,890 --> 00:17:20,070
those that you share pics to members of

343
00:17:18,270 --> 00:17:24,300
the family in Australia then you can

344
00:17:20,069 --> 00:17:27,720
share yeah that's my so Twitter are much

345
00:17:24,300 --> 00:17:30,060
better okay we spend a lot of time on

346
00:17:27,720 --> 00:17:31,860
Twitter again you probably mute as not

347
00:17:30,060 --> 00:17:33,310
blockers if not why not

348
00:17:31,860 --> 00:17:40,719
you probably will be

349
00:17:33,310 --> 00:17:43,120
as we speak right now yes there are very

350
00:17:40,720 --> 00:17:47,560
little data breach you know 250,000

351
00:17:43,120 --> 00:17:51,550
Beckles 2013 and $330 million 330

352
00:17:47,560 --> 00:17:54,179
million record you know it's what makes

353
00:17:51,550 --> 00:17:58,180
us pretty recently pretty recently need

354
00:17:54,180 --> 00:18:01,360
330 million records that's nearly the

355
00:17:58,180 --> 00:18:04,060
population of the USA for 65 million

356
00:18:01,360 --> 00:18:06,280
people in the USA for people to look up

357
00:18:04,060 --> 00:18:09,370
the records breach and you know

358
00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:11,680
similarly to Facebook that man can I

359
00:18:09,370 --> 00:18:13,840
don't know write a lot about what we

360
00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:17,680
gather about racism about sensitive

361
00:18:13,840 --> 00:18:19,419
about transphobia etc etc you kind of go

362
00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:21,670
to where they are well now is freedom of

363
00:18:19,420 --> 00:18:25,110
speech and also the classic American

364
00:18:21,670 --> 00:18:28,000
 it's not terrible laughing with

365
00:18:25,110 --> 00:18:31,590
politically motivated worthiness the

366
00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:31,590
smile again to remove bad actors

367
00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:38,320
well no you see Freddie Mercury last

368
00:18:37,960 --> 00:18:42,750
night

369
00:18:38,320 --> 00:19:11,290
yeah kiss it's a different makes at West

370
00:18:42,750 --> 00:19:14,290
and again they're all that make you so I

371
00:19:11,290 --> 00:19:15,370
lived through this off off Google Google

372
00:19:14,290 --> 00:19:16,990
last year actually

373
00:19:15,370 --> 00:19:19,360
so the recommend is at least three

374
00:19:16,990 --> 00:19:19,770
records of leaked data per human on the

375
00:19:19,360 --> 00:19:23,439
planet

376
00:19:19,770 --> 00:19:25,840
so roughly seven billion humans exist on

377
00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:27,760
the earth therefore you've got the 21

378
00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:30,159
billion that's really from information

379
00:19:27,760 --> 00:19:33,220
around known breaches speeding that that

380
00:19:30,160 --> 00:19:36,040
made their way into the news made the

381
00:19:33,220 --> 00:19:38,700
way into allowed impound of similar

382
00:19:36,040 --> 00:19:42,129
services like that but it's got to be

383
00:19:38,700 --> 00:19:46,360
significantly not just the collection

384
00:19:42,130 --> 00:19:46,980
records the kibo the equation records

385
00:19:46,360 --> 00:19:51,000
the cubicle

386
00:19:46,980 --> 00:19:52,740
Oh anyone anyone here that the question

387
00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:55,440
right is that the one one terabyte of

388
00:19:52,740 --> 00:19:57,240
personal details yet I may or may not

389
00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:59,940
have acquired that information is a

390
00:19:57,240 --> 00:20:02,490
hundred billion unique user names and

391
00:19:59,940 --> 00:20:04,740
passwords so that's like five things

392
00:20:02,490 --> 00:20:07,170
that's what 15 for every person on the

393
00:20:04,740 --> 00:20:09,690
planet it's quite quite a bit more so

394
00:20:07,170 --> 00:20:10,500
yeah it's pretty scary and weak so

395
00:20:09,690 --> 00:20:12,810
happen all the time

396
00:20:10,500 --> 00:20:15,030
breaches will happen every day here of

397
00:20:12,810 --> 00:20:17,760
new things we've got a slightly or no

398
00:20:15,030 --> 00:20:18,899
but I think we've got some bit on for

399
00:20:17,760 --> 00:20:21,480
all the different pieces and things but

400
00:20:18,900 --> 00:20:23,490
it's quite good and all these companies

401
00:20:21,480 --> 00:20:25,500
are just boarding your data and some of

402
00:20:23,490 --> 00:20:27,030
them are less secure than others you do

403
00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:28,350
have some that have things that bug by

404
00:20:27,030 --> 00:20:30,540
the program so we should properly or

405
00:20:28,350 --> 00:20:32,760
under to try and secure them people

406
00:20:30,540 --> 00:20:35,040
aren't having continued security so the

407
00:20:32,760 --> 00:20:37,680
keynote topic you have the security belt

408
00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:40,260
life cycle of stuff so or doesn't really

409
00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:44,900
but anyway how's the kid TLD art that

410
00:20:40,260 --> 00:20:44,900
was the synopsis of the top that's begun

411
00:20:46,760 --> 00:20:52,400
and what we will talk about a little bit

412
00:20:52,670 --> 00:20:57,360
it's an attribution I think there's a

413
00:20:55,290 --> 00:20:58,889
lack of an appetite for people to care

414
00:20:57,360 --> 00:21:01,500
about daily unless we can attribute

415
00:20:58,890 --> 00:21:04,590
attribute it back to you an organization

416
00:21:01,500 --> 00:21:06,270
with the collection one rule of bridges

417
00:21:04,590 --> 00:21:12,590
there wasn't any attribution it was just

418
00:21:06,270 --> 00:21:12,590
day at a mass historical breaches okay

419
00:21:13,460 --> 00:21:20,700
this is deliberate it's not an accident

420
00:21:16,790 --> 00:21:23,159
so remembers being significant you know

421
00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:26,520
it nearly who remembers be a British

422
00:21:23,160 --> 00:21:28,440
Airways losing a load of card data

423
00:21:26,520 --> 00:21:35,250
around the length of time last year

424
00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:37,380
okay so they fell prey to a out classic

425
00:21:35,250 --> 00:21:39,570
as a reasonably sophisticated attack as

426
00:21:37,380 --> 00:21:43,020
in some South was put into it to make it

427
00:21:39,570 --> 00:21:47,340
happen the server was South in Eastern

428
00:21:43,020 --> 00:21:49,500
Europe an HTTP has been HTTP certificate

429
00:21:47,340 --> 00:21:51,209
was ordered and acquired and the man was

430
00:21:49,500 --> 00:21:54,150
registered that looks a bit like DA's

431
00:21:51,210 --> 00:21:57,300
website and then they drop the magic our

432
00:21:54,150 --> 00:21:58,830
JavaScript into some Java in javascript

433
00:21:57,300 --> 00:22:01,230
in the website and their pen

434
00:21:58,830 --> 00:22:03,029
and it took your payment card data and

435
00:22:01,230 --> 00:22:06,510
sending off the Romania whenever you

436
00:22:03,029 --> 00:22:08,640
made a purchase would be a so it's kind

437
00:22:06,510 --> 00:22:10,980
of cool classic supply chain poisoning

438
00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:12,090
attack so this is something that we're

439
00:22:10,980 --> 00:22:14,100
talking about again at the end of the

440
00:22:12,090 --> 00:22:16,168
presentation and the supply chain

441
00:22:14,100 --> 00:22:18,719
poisoning bees on the other okay it's

442
00:22:16,169 --> 00:22:20,429
something that we are my organization

443
00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:23,130
develops a lot of software and I'm

444
00:22:20,429 --> 00:22:25,140
particularly concerned by in this

445
00:22:23,130 --> 00:22:28,019
example three hundred and eighty

446
00:22:25,140 --> 00:22:32,100
thousand cards were was stolen so that's

447
00:22:28,019 --> 00:22:34,350
a big deal it's the person big GD P R X

448
00:22:32,100 --> 00:22:37,860
breach since the GDP are can you see

449
00:22:34,350 --> 00:22:40,260
existence in the UK last May so it'll be

450
00:22:37,860 --> 00:22:41,850
interesting to see how the ICO handles

451
00:22:40,260 --> 00:22:44,340
this given that it's a very large

452
00:22:41,850 --> 00:22:48,389
British institution let's drop the ball

453
00:22:44,340 --> 00:22:51,059
I see yesterday so not gdpr into the FCA

454
00:22:48,389 --> 00:22:53,699
in the US is there a head of the tech

455
00:22:51,059 --> 00:22:56,820
top yeah as you see on youtube I think

456
00:22:53,700 --> 00:22:59,130
having a five five million dollars

457
00:22:56,820 --> 00:23:01,230
yesterday by FC eight for using personal

458
00:22:59,130 --> 00:23:03,929
data so it's happening all the long but

459
00:23:01,230 --> 00:23:06,019
like GDP is a big like our GDP I

460
00:23:03,929 --> 00:23:08,429
almost thought about it but it's like

461
00:23:06,019 --> 00:23:09,750
I'm not I'm not expend this was like ten

462
00:23:08,429 --> 00:23:11,639
percent or like five percent of Europe

463
00:23:09,750 --> 00:23:15,480
your garage tunnel where you get fined

464
00:23:11,639 --> 00:23:18,510
so do or find other people get faded as

465
00:23:15,480 --> 00:23:20,460
well if they make that right your are

466
00:23:18,510 --> 00:23:23,510
yes oh the for the seven or twenty

467
00:23:20,460 --> 00:23:27,350
million euro of your annual revenue

468
00:23:23,510 --> 00:23:29,190
surpassed whichever is higher

469
00:23:27,350 --> 00:23:32,039
shown you you

470
00:23:29,190 --> 00:23:35,909
Josef he was about GDP up you've got

471
00:23:32,039 --> 00:23:39,059
music yeah so when GDP Rama came out I

472
00:23:35,909 --> 00:23:40,409
have high hopes for it I was hoping that

473
00:23:39,059 --> 00:23:41,610
companies would actually viewed and

474
00:23:40,409 --> 00:23:42,960
start taking a seriously

475
00:23:41,610 --> 00:23:45,600
specially you're talking about four

476
00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:47,779
percent global turnover that can be

477
00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:51,389
quite significant man up really quickly

478
00:23:47,779 --> 00:23:54,080
unfortunately I haven't quite seen that

479
00:23:51,389 --> 00:23:57,178
take on maybe it's too soon to tell but

480
00:23:54,080 --> 00:23:59,760
we constantly seen almost on a daily

481
00:23:57,179 --> 00:24:02,210
basis this Beach has happened as

482
00:23:59,760 --> 00:24:04,769
breaches happen the speeches happen and

483
00:24:02,210 --> 00:24:08,130
just the other day on Twitter someone

484
00:24:04,769 --> 00:24:10,139
was going on about and hackable the

485
00:24:08,130 --> 00:24:10,720
bassinet and they were telling about how

486
00:24:10,139 --> 00:24:14,679
DDP

487
00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:17,950
is only focused on gaining consent and

488
00:24:14,680 --> 00:24:20,680
they're missing the point of the old the

489
00:24:17,950 --> 00:24:23,890
other part of GDP are which are you have

490
00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:26,320
to allow for a removal of data

491
00:24:23,890 --> 00:24:28,090
someone can request what data you're

492
00:24:26,320 --> 00:24:29,830
holding so it's quite apparent that

493
00:24:28,090 --> 00:24:32,770
people store missing the point of GDP

494
00:24:29,830 --> 00:24:35,560
are and I told we start seeing real fans

495
00:24:32,770 --> 00:24:38,650
issued and hampering companies and

496
00:24:35,560 --> 00:24:41,080
actually providing a incentive to follow

497
00:24:38,650 --> 00:24:45,550
and do the correct things I don't think

498
00:24:41,080 --> 00:24:48,210
it's going to have much teeth which will

499
00:24:45,550 --> 00:24:51,100
see it we'll see okay

500
00:24:48,210 --> 00:24:53,530
there's particular cases of cost of PCI

501
00:24:51,100 --> 00:24:55,300
DSS concern anyone familiar with the PCI

502
00:24:53,530 --> 00:24:58,300
DSS paper card industry data security

503
00:24:55,300 --> 00:25:02,350
standard since we like what came before

504
00:24:58,300 --> 00:25:05,620
anybody cared about GDP up specifically

505
00:25:02,350 --> 00:25:08,409
around carpeted a service of cards debit

506
00:25:05,620 --> 00:25:13,120
cards that kind of stuff MasterCard etc

507
00:25:08,410 --> 00:25:16,090
I think because he's a per count of

508
00:25:13,120 --> 00:25:19,239
finite in some lost card the PCI DSS

509
00:25:16,090 --> 00:25:22,649
will will find the organization I think

510
00:25:19,240 --> 00:25:29,290
that they're gonna get bubbly later yes

511
00:25:22,650 --> 00:25:30,730
but time will tell okay so we said we'd

512
00:25:29,290 --> 00:25:32,159
freshened up the talk from the one that

513
00:25:30,730 --> 00:25:34,600
we did at least so we have done

514
00:25:32,160 --> 00:25:36,610
collection one has been a thing since or

515
00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:38,620
at least around the same sort of time

516
00:25:36,610 --> 00:25:40,870
so in collection one there were seven

517
00:25:38,620 --> 00:25:44,560
hundred and seventy three million unique

518
00:25:40,870 --> 00:25:47,379
records and it was all them fighting on

519
00:25:44,560 --> 00:25:49,720
Twitter about some people we have

520
00:25:47,380 --> 00:25:50,920
regular contact with works going up

521
00:25:49,720 --> 00:25:53,110
other people that we have regular

522
00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:55,660
contact with about well it's just

523
00:25:53,110 --> 00:25:57,699
data so who cares because we can't

524
00:25:55,660 --> 00:26:00,160
tribute it back to any organization or

525
00:25:57,700 --> 00:26:02,140
any single late box who cares

526
00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:06,130
that it's attributable

527
00:26:02,140 --> 00:26:08,260
my dad is in that solve them are so so

528
00:26:06,130 --> 00:26:10,080
by looking through the Fiat on some of

529
00:26:08,260 --> 00:26:12,520
them are truth or will do sites like

530
00:26:10,080 --> 00:26:15,220
there's like five different quite adopts

531
00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:16,990
their various sizes but the first one is

532
00:26:15,220 --> 00:26:19,510
and in public its callback public and

533
00:26:16,990 --> 00:26:21,010
it's to be able to various what I'm

534
00:26:19,510 --> 00:26:24,520
calling off websites and Bitcoin

535
00:26:21,010 --> 00:26:27,640
exchanges so we're just well yeah

536
00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:29,350
Oh oh there but the new they are and

537
00:26:27,640 --> 00:26:32,950
things were really too bloody Yahoo

538
00:26:29,350 --> 00:26:35,889
peaches other this is the collection to

539
00:26:32,950 --> 00:26:39,730
equation 2 equation for a definite they

540
00:26:35,890 --> 00:26:41,410
are so whoever uploaded and all the data

541
00:26:39,730 --> 00:26:43,210
with makes a minute so the segment

542
00:26:41,410 --> 00:26:45,370
though the different categories you've

543
00:26:43,210 --> 00:26:47,020
got a title day you've got a card you

544
00:26:45,370 --> 00:26:51,729
could user names and passwords of your

545
00:26:47,020 --> 00:26:54,429
forums you've got things like e-commerce

546
00:26:51,730 --> 00:26:57,580
sites lots of things book notes but they

547
00:26:54,429 --> 00:27:00,490
it's not faceless de-ice is quite a lot

548
00:26:57,580 --> 00:27:02,290
of data so the the the question was 770

549
00:27:00,490 --> 00:27:04,660
million bit absolute overalls for 100

550
00:27:02,290 --> 00:27:07,300
unique billion so I had 100 billion

551
00:27:04,660 --> 00:27:08,380
unique sense of credentials which is

552
00:27:07,300 --> 00:27:12,460
quite a big one post

553
00:27:08,380 --> 00:27:14,170
so it's haven't done the sort and unique

554
00:27:12,460 --> 00:27:16,179
in the actual password last year but I

555
00:27:14,170 --> 00:27:18,700
reckon is probably about 50 or 60

556
00:27:16,179 --> 00:27:20,740
billion unique passwords in there we're

557
00:27:18,700 --> 00:27:22,120
talking like password one spot lowercase

558
00:27:20,740 --> 00:27:23,650
uppercase that's like a definite

559
00:27:22,120 --> 00:27:25,809
possible for this there's going to be a

560
00:27:23,650 --> 00:27:27,820
lot of work but cover that said it may

561
00:27:25,809 --> 00:27:30,820
be the new rock you there produces for

562
00:27:27,820 --> 00:27:35,649
pen test it may end up in that so anyway

563
00:27:30,820 --> 00:27:38,139
that's my two cents but never was

564
00:27:35,650 --> 00:27:40,600
it's an astonishing number and again go

565
00:27:38,140 --> 00:27:42,850
back to the idea that 21 million records

566
00:27:40,600 --> 00:27:44,020
is now easily exceeding 100 billion our

567
00:27:42,850 --> 00:27:46,149
cousin again a hundred billion a

568
00:27:44,020 --> 00:27:48,040
thoughts well in how many years time

569
00:27:46,150 --> 00:27:50,470
will be superseded by trillions you know

570
00:27:48,040 --> 00:27:51,870
yeah and again not really is stores come

571
00:27:50,470 --> 00:27:54,490
to the service which is hence the

572
00:27:51,870 --> 00:27:56,530
analogous iceberg so we only really

573
00:27:54,490 --> 00:28:00,700
seeing what we're seeing

574
00:27:56,530 --> 00:28:03,570
yeah okay and it goes drive on the point

575
00:28:00,700 --> 00:28:11,020
that there is all the data out there

576
00:28:03,570 --> 00:28:13,178
basically I just so I think a large

577
00:28:11,020 --> 00:28:17,830
country reading faculty a lot of those

578
00:28:13,179 --> 00:28:20,440
data is the change in databases so

579
00:28:17,830 --> 00:28:22,840
you're going back in the past you see

580
00:28:20,440 --> 00:28:25,300
have your database stored somewhere in

581
00:28:22,840 --> 00:28:28,809
some back network if you have some

582
00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:31,809
service configuration it's not such a

583
00:28:28,809 --> 00:28:34,149
major issue I mean yes it's not great

584
00:28:31,809 --> 00:28:35,040
but it's not like anyone can send you

585
00:28:34,150 --> 00:28:38,940
get it now

586
00:28:35,040 --> 00:28:41,220
when AWS s3 buckets and sunny some

587
00:28:38,940 --> 00:28:43,320
farmers configuration and the entire

588
00:28:41,220 --> 00:28:45,540
wall can get it and you constantly seen

589
00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:48,810
the steam come to over and again I think

590
00:28:45,540 --> 00:28:52,020
it was what was the Reuters or something

591
00:28:48,810 --> 00:28:55,020
this week or the downtrend I can't

592
00:28:52,020 --> 00:28:57,480
remember but again they had a database

593
00:28:55,020 --> 00:29:00,840
open on the internet found that was easy

594
00:28:57,480 --> 00:29:02,790
accessible identification two weeks ago

595
00:29:00,840 --> 00:29:06,030
a little bit longer than that they're

596
00:29:02,790 --> 00:29:07,860
Swedish medical company all core records

597
00:29:06,030 --> 00:29:10,500
wide open on the internet and

598
00:29:07,860 --> 00:29:11,939
authentication needed so constant theme

599
00:29:10,500 --> 00:29:14,250
happened in the game again so if you're

600
00:29:11,940 --> 00:29:15,030
going to put something on your database

601
00:29:14,250 --> 00:29:17,100
on the Internet

602
00:29:15,030 --> 00:29:18,840
make sure it's thoroughly tested

603
00:29:17,100 --> 00:29:21,240
reviewed and they have the correct

604
00:29:18,840 --> 00:29:27,750
configuration for it or just gulp it up

605
00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:29,280
or that pedestal yeah quick charms again

606
00:29:27,750 --> 00:29:32,160
anybody seen this graphic before all

607
00:29:29,280 --> 00:29:33,990
this is this website okay this

608
00:29:32,160 --> 00:29:36,210
information is beautiful and they do a

609
00:29:33,990 --> 00:29:37,650
really beautiful visual representation

610
00:29:36,210 --> 00:29:41,880
of the data breaches I think that see

611
00:29:37,650 --> 00:29:44,190
around 22,000 or thereabouts and I find

612
00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:45,950
it particularly impactful at work when

613
00:29:44,190 --> 00:29:48,570
I'm doing presentations in certainly

614
00:29:45,950 --> 00:29:52,280
because everybody in the room is in one

615
00:29:48,570 --> 00:29:57,270
of these or what a lot of these plots

616
00:29:52,280 --> 00:29:59,610
and a lot presentation it was with us

617
00:29:57,270 --> 00:30:01,470
who was staying at the Marriott at that

618
00:29:59,610 --> 00:30:04,439
particular time and so we took the piss

619
00:30:01,470 --> 00:30:05,760
out him a little bit because he was

620
00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:08,310
stopped them at the Marriott and I just

621
00:30:05,760 --> 00:30:15,090
lost a paltry three hundred and eighty

622
00:30:08,310 --> 00:30:17,520
three million records the problem is

623
00:30:15,090 --> 00:30:19,110
almost unimaginable I get a little bit

624
00:30:17,520 --> 00:30:21,389
concerned and increasingly concerned

625
00:30:19,110 --> 00:30:23,840
that we're caring less about it because

626
00:30:21,390 --> 00:30:26,700
is that the frequency which is happening

627
00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:29,250
and I think that these sensitization is

628
00:30:26,700 --> 00:30:31,470
a real a real worry premieres and

629
00:30:29,250 --> 00:30:34,350
information security professional the

630
00:30:31,470 --> 00:30:37,500
unless the number is in the Brazilian

631
00:30:34,350 --> 00:30:40,320
it's not even news worth it nobody seems

632
00:30:37,500 --> 00:30:43,380
to wanna get too excited about it or if

633
00:30:40,320 --> 00:30:46,139
I said no would say yeah or even so yeah

634
00:30:43,380 --> 00:30:49,200
lost another 500 really well yahoo has

635
00:30:46,140 --> 00:30:51,420
met but i used to working well authority

636
00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:54,810
in education for a fairly large

637
00:30:51,420 --> 00:30:56,970
authority and we got really upset one

638
00:30:54,810 --> 00:31:03,000
record was breached particularly if it

639
00:30:56,970 --> 00:31:05,040
was a child a child or a child with

640
00:31:03,000 --> 00:31:09,270
special educational need anything like

641
00:31:05,040 --> 00:31:11,129
that that's water so I can't be upset by

642
00:31:09,270 --> 00:31:14,310
war record going out so much you know

643
00:31:11,130 --> 00:31:17,670
outside get Wendy's 500 really

644
00:31:14,310 --> 00:31:20,220
rage and but yet so whether it's one

645
00:31:17,670 --> 00:31:20,610
whether it's a million records it's a

646
00:31:20,220 --> 00:31:22,470
record

647
00:31:20,610 --> 00:31:25,340
it could impact something in adverse or

648
00:31:22,470 --> 00:31:32,040
negative way we should give a yeah

649
00:31:25,340 --> 00:31:34,530
who's that no one knows it's died of

650
00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:37,500
adding the former CEO talk talk

651
00:31:34,530 --> 00:31:44,129
so how much never how's this time out

652
00:31:37,500 --> 00:31:45,720
who remembers the 2015 told to hack so

653
00:31:44,130 --> 00:31:46,740
it's bad enough when you get attacked in

654
00:31:45,720 --> 00:31:48,120
this bug knife wound healing

655
00:31:46,740 --> 00:31:50,310
you lose day and but what really

656
00:31:48,120 --> 00:31:52,409
compounds a situation makes it worse is

657
00:31:50,310 --> 00:31:56,760
how you handle the situation after

658
00:31:52,410 --> 00:32:00,120
during her after the event so it's a

659
00:31:56,760 --> 00:32:02,340
story born under quite some pressure die

660
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:03,899
hard II was the sole representative for

661
00:32:02,340 --> 00:32:06,929
the organization that was she'll dying

662
00:32:03,900 --> 00:32:08,730
from the news to talk the world through

663
00:32:06,930 --> 00:32:10,800
what was happening because it was a live

664
00:32:08,730 --> 00:32:14,940
event when she was on TV talking about

665
00:32:10,800 --> 00:32:18,050
it and she was fairly well off le

666
00:32:14,940 --> 00:32:20,070
ill-equipped should I say to actually

667
00:32:18,050 --> 00:32:22,020
tell anybody what was happening because

668
00:32:20,070 --> 00:32:23,790
she didn't know what's happening so the

669
00:32:22,020 --> 00:32:25,680
first message that died out put out was

670
00:32:23,790 --> 00:32:29,730
that they were nothing happening yeah

671
00:32:25,680 --> 00:32:31,500
they were an act some sort of technical

672
00:32:29,730 --> 00:32:34,620
issue that was what was it play at the

673
00:32:31,500 --> 00:32:36,240
time to begin with but the security

674
00:32:34,620 --> 00:32:36,780
industry were not stupid we're pretty

675
00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:38,580
smart

676
00:32:36,780 --> 00:32:40,410
and we caught really really quickly

677
00:32:38,580 --> 00:32:42,419
actually told that we were getting

678
00:32:40,410 --> 00:32:45,420
happening hats so she had to go on and

679
00:32:42,420 --> 00:32:47,390
tell him go Harold in hats but you have

680
00:32:45,420 --> 00:32:51,900
an answer if you have tribution

681
00:32:47,390 --> 00:32:54,720
straight away so it was rough you based

682
00:32:51,900 --> 00:32:56,880
islamic jihaddists that was a

683
00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:58,170
diversionary tactic I just

684
00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:02,790
get the media and go off and look at

685
00:32:58,170 --> 00:33:04,470
what that wise and if it isn't

686
00:33:02,790 --> 00:33:05,790
anything right so they take a lot of

687
00:33:04,470 --> 00:33:07,290
googling to come to a conclusion that

688
00:33:05,790 --> 00:33:08,580
there aren't any such things it's just

689
00:33:07,290 --> 00:33:10,860
buzzword playing field we're just paying

690
00:33:08,580 --> 00:33:12,810
a few words from the news and go it

691
00:33:10,860 --> 00:33:14,490
that's what we use correct and that's

692
00:33:12,810 --> 00:33:18,179
what happened so while the media were

693
00:33:14,490 --> 00:33:19,800
busy doing that they were preparing the

694
00:33:18,180 --> 00:33:21,600
next information package which was vibe

695
00:33:19,800 --> 00:33:24,659
by which count they'd realize that

696
00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:27,929
they'd lost data but that no personal

697
00:33:24,660 --> 00:33:29,520
David being breached and I was like okay

698
00:33:27,930 --> 00:33:31,860
that's cool talk talk customers calm

699
00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:35,340
down it's good they lost through the

700
00:33:31,860 --> 00:33:39,830
serial numbers it's fine no problem or

701
00:33:35,340 --> 00:33:39,830
just IP addresses yeah that's personal

702
00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:47,370
some personal men may have been breached

703
00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:49,409
well I entirely feel but so does God

704
00:33:47,370 --> 00:33:53,149
we'll keep you posted and then

705
00:33:49,410 --> 00:33:53,150
ultimately and I'll let you to read this

706
00:33:58,460 --> 00:34:02,430
and emails suggested people that is

707
00:34:00,750 --> 00:34:04,800
glaring at the law so we've got a

708
00:34:02,430 --> 00:34:06,660
disclaimer at the top Justin

709
00:34:04,800 --> 00:34:08,759
nobody strike soon as yet but as I have

710
00:34:06,660 --> 00:34:10,260
said many times you can't you can't sake

711
00:34:08,760 --> 00:34:15,420
anything away from nothing

712
00:34:10,260 --> 00:34:17,130
that's true so hey it wasn't handled

713
00:34:15,420 --> 00:34:20,340
very well okay the incident response

714
00:34:17,130 --> 00:34:23,100
here was terrible but that happens

715
00:34:20,340 --> 00:34:25,400
that's the only students but the they

716
00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:27,239
put the head of the organization out

717
00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:28,800
home they're out to dry

718
00:34:27,239 --> 00:34:30,839
also like I should pull myself out to

719
00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:32,730
dry by taking your to what the

720
00:34:30,840 --> 00:34:34,700
responsible ultimate responsibility for

721
00:34:32,730 --> 00:34:39,330
guaranteeing and talking nonsense

722
00:34:34,699 --> 00:34:40,859
repeatedly this is what the truth of the

723
00:34:39,330 --> 00:34:43,110
story was it was a fifteen-year-old kid

724
00:34:40,860 --> 00:34:47,610
from Northern Ireland there's a hacker

725
00:34:43,110 --> 00:34:49,110
Tom Anthony is actually a picture one

726
00:34:47,610 --> 00:34:52,590
hundred and fifty seven thousand records

727
00:34:49,110 --> 00:34:55,440
so not not many I love to get really too

728
00:34:52,590 --> 00:34:58,620
upset about right yeah

729
00:34:55,440 --> 00:35:01,050
but including customary but included

730
00:34:58,620 --> 00:35:04,380
back data as well and it'll took or a

731
00:35:01,050 --> 00:35:06,120
house inside 40 hours for scammers to

732
00:35:04,380 --> 00:35:07,780
start ringing talks or customers

733
00:35:06,120 --> 00:35:10,240
consenting to be the organizer

734
00:35:07,780 --> 00:35:16,090
I'm getting them to do things unwanted

735
00:35:10,240 --> 00:35:19,450
actions via social engineering but it

736
00:35:16,090 --> 00:35:23,710
wasn't a Russia base Islamic jihadist is

737
00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:29,020
a kiss but now it's a post talk talk

738
00:35:23,710 --> 00:35:30,760
Korea picture of data Harding ago no

739
00:35:29,020 --> 00:35:33,040
it's the nap in there

740
00:35:30,760 --> 00:35:35,050
I guess it's battleship I don't know

741
00:35:33,040 --> 00:35:36,400
what you haven't looked too flustered by

742
00:35:35,050 --> 00:35:39,190
it she was made of Baroness as a

743
00:35:36,400 --> 00:35:41,490
consequence of that and off she

744
00:35:39,190 --> 00:35:46,570
which for anybody that doesn't know

745
00:35:41,490 --> 00:35:48,729
who's heard of general if she's clever

746
00:35:46,570 --> 00:35:51,520
social engineer she doesn't tell him

747
00:35:48,730 --> 00:35:56,530
work as well on the haunted she killed

748
00:35:51,520 --> 00:35:59,350
neutral issues conference by tell him

749
00:35:56,530 --> 00:36:04,560
and Ashley killed with them well he's

750
00:35:59,350 --> 00:36:08,080
sitting shoes right she got away with it

751
00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:11,009
moved on and talk talk we've done no

752
00:36:08,080 --> 00:36:14,680
matter the point that sure made earlier

753
00:36:11,010 --> 00:36:18,100
because it was pre GDP are it was damn

754
00:36:14,680 --> 00:36:19,540
potentially ear if eyes so the the

755
00:36:18,100 --> 00:36:22,020
Information Commissioner's Office fine

756
00:36:19,540 --> 00:36:26,500
talk talk four hundred thousand pounds

757
00:36:22,020 --> 00:36:28,740
for that breach in 2015 all the GDP half

758
00:36:26,500 --> 00:36:31,990
go back to the idea of four percent of

759
00:36:28,740 --> 00:36:32,890
global revenue or twenty million euro

760
00:36:31,990 --> 00:36:35,319
whichever is higher

761
00:36:32,890 --> 00:36:39,120
fine could have been a size seventy two

762
00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:41,740
million pounds which is a big difference

763
00:36:39,120 --> 00:36:43,270
that's you it's a few quid now it's also

764
00:36:41,740 --> 00:36:46,229
going to absorb that because their

765
00:36:43,270 --> 00:36:48,580
revenue 2015 was 1.8 billion pounds okay

766
00:36:46,230 --> 00:36:53,100
but then it will set a few share all

767
00:36:48,580 --> 00:36:53,100
that's right living on the dividends

768
00:36:53,610 --> 00:36:59,020
although seemingly companies recover

769
00:36:56,020 --> 00:37:03,370
from that payout on their Facebook is

770
00:36:59,020 --> 00:37:05,650
still so just to have something to you

771
00:37:03,370 --> 00:37:08,890
the whole fiasco is and we see this

772
00:37:05,650 --> 00:37:13,180
often on Twitter we get someone going

773
00:37:08,890 --> 00:37:16,029
ads on behalf of the company not giving

774
00:37:13,180 --> 00:37:18,490
them the tractor bus especially under

775
00:37:16,030 --> 00:37:19,730
pressure so one thing I can't just need

776
00:37:18,490 --> 00:37:22,069
to do is make sure

777
00:37:19,730 --> 00:37:24,700
have some sort of strategy Wendy on

778
00:37:22,070 --> 00:37:27,440
social media as well the media itself

779
00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:29,930
especially in terms of incident response

780
00:37:27,440 --> 00:37:32,480
pack make sure that you have all the

781
00:37:29,930 --> 00:37:33,970
facts in the units on hand beforehand

782
00:37:32,480 --> 00:37:37,430
before you give any official

783
00:37:33,970 --> 00:37:38,149
correspondence to media doing so means

784
00:37:37,430 --> 00:37:39,379
you're going to have the right

785
00:37:38,150 --> 00:37:41,390
information you can give the right

786
00:37:39,380 --> 00:37:43,790
details and you don't end up with the

787
00:37:41,390 --> 00:37:47,180
scenario where it's information going

788
00:37:43,790 --> 00:37:48,609
back and forth yep absolutely

789
00:37:47,180 --> 00:37:53,169
and we'll talk about a bit more of the

790
00:37:48,609 --> 00:37:56,210
anatomy of amulet avarage a little bit

791
00:37:53,170 --> 00:37:58,369
so what we don't want to do is paint a

792
00:37:56,210 --> 00:38:00,440
picture of organizations that everybody

793
00:37:58,369 --> 00:38:02,060
out there is out there not caring about

794
00:38:00,440 --> 00:38:04,119
security because a lot of organizations

795
00:38:02,060 --> 00:38:06,350
are the vast majority of organizations

796
00:38:04,119 --> 00:38:06,890
thing and they are doing something about

797
00:38:06,350 --> 00:38:09,500
it

798
00:38:06,890 --> 00:38:11,839
of course it seems that the lives of the

799
00:38:09,500 --> 00:38:13,340
organization the less they care that's a

800
00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:14,930
perception I'll let you draw your own

801
00:38:13,340 --> 00:38:16,040
conclusions with that one thing that is

802
00:38:14,930 --> 00:38:17,600
in fact is the large of the

803
00:38:16,040 --> 00:38:21,430
organization's the large and the data

804
00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:23,650
would often have different worry and

805
00:38:21,430 --> 00:38:26,089
what firms are doing things like

806
00:38:23,650 --> 00:38:27,770
adopting robust security controls they

807
00:38:26,090 --> 00:38:29,630
are doing security rather than doing

808
00:38:27,770 --> 00:38:33,560
compliance and then open up a little

809
00:38:29,630 --> 00:38:35,359
security the other way around we are

810
00:38:33,560 --> 00:38:38,690
seeing an emergence to responsible

811
00:38:35,359 --> 00:38:40,250
disclosure you made a thing anybody that

812
00:38:38,690 --> 00:38:42,560
knows Victor givers knows that he's

813
00:38:40,250 --> 00:38:47,230
about to be involved in that community

814
00:38:42,560 --> 00:38:50,060
for a number of years and 5,000

815
00:38:47,230 --> 00:38:52,100
responsibilities learners who's a demon

816
00:38:50,060 --> 00:38:54,500
eye and he's leading the way he's a

817
00:38:52,100 --> 00:38:56,330
pioneer in that space around working

818
00:38:54,500 --> 00:39:00,430
with organizations when the bad things

819
00:38:56,330 --> 00:39:02,750
happen to make to handle them smooth but

820
00:39:00,430 --> 00:39:04,730
to do the right thing after you fail

821
00:39:02,750 --> 00:39:07,340
when it's the best way to describe it

822
00:39:04,730 --> 00:39:09,050
and bug bounty schemes we've got a slide

823
00:39:07,340 --> 00:39:16,130
on that and it's quite actually involved

824
00:39:09,050 --> 00:39:23,090
in that enough space because you both

825
00:39:16,130 --> 00:39:25,550
got seeing the East you know that's not

826
00:39:23,090 --> 00:39:28,040
minor chords and three exchange we'll

827
00:39:25,550 --> 00:39:29,930
touch on that and breach handling we're

828
00:39:28,040 --> 00:39:32,500
going to talk about that in detail and

829
00:39:29,930 --> 00:39:33,790
then multi-factor authentication

830
00:39:32,500 --> 00:39:38,900
something when it's

831
00:39:33,790 --> 00:39:40,279
so some work so anything we in couldn't

832
00:39:38,900 --> 00:39:45,350
be with us but there is a picture in

833
00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:50,750
here not very clear but laughing before

834
00:39:45,350 --> 00:39:57,400
I started shaving who uses my phone I'm

835
00:39:50,750 --> 00:40:04,850
gonna do much Sean here uses mfx

836
00:39:57,400 --> 00:40:06,950
that's had a few showdown so one of the

837
00:40:04,850 --> 00:40:09,319
things that MFA help preventing instance

838
00:40:06,950 --> 00:40:11,180
things like credential stuffing so those

839
00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:14,750
who don't know credential stuff he knows

840
00:40:11,180 --> 00:40:17,569
we take Noreen password from a most

841
00:40:14,750 --> 00:40:20,540
likely line reach and you try them on

842
00:40:17,570 --> 00:40:22,610
different accounts and since people

843
00:40:20,540 --> 00:40:24,740
really use passwords hope I owe you

844
00:40:22,610 --> 00:40:28,960
something but access MF air will then

845
00:40:24,740 --> 00:40:31,100
prevent that standing and another later

846
00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:33,950
some companies are doing a really great

847
00:40:31,100 --> 00:40:36,230
job in terms of encouraging MFO so

848
00:40:33,950 --> 00:40:38,750
MailChimp is one where they give you I

849
00:40:36,230 --> 00:40:43,400
think a 10% discount if you have a phone

850
00:40:38,750 --> 00:40:46,250
booth on your account fortnight so a lot

851
00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:52,540
of people this from lawyer with will pay

852
00:40:46,250 --> 00:40:56,410
for it not they encourage MFA by doing

853
00:40:52,540 --> 00:41:07,610
giving away the free patents in the

854
00:40:56,410 --> 00:41:12,290
fortnight so yeah the general point is

855
00:41:07,610 --> 00:41:17,630
ease summer soon anything is better than

856
00:41:12,290 --> 00:41:22,490
that so we can involve the arguments a

857
00:41:17,630 --> 00:41:25,160
lot don't we do not against each other

858
00:41:22,490 --> 00:41:26,899
we wait or these try to set the hand an

859
00:41:25,160 --> 00:41:28,940
argumentative bastards well the same

860
00:41:26,900 --> 00:41:32,590
page about British everything how he

861
00:41:28,940 --> 00:41:32,590
keeps quiet cause you're always be you

862
00:41:33,010 --> 00:41:36,560
well things like password managers you

863
00:41:35,480 --> 00:41:40,520
may have seen if you follow me on

864
00:41:36,560 --> 00:41:42,700
Twitter got a lot of poll should he use

865
00:41:40,520 --> 00:41:46,910
them or should you avoid them knows only

866
00:41:42,700 --> 00:41:47,359
three questions and I got four thousand

867
00:41:46,910 --> 00:41:48,680
to

868
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:51,350
negative votes on Twitter on that

869
00:41:48,680 --> 00:41:53,210
particular poll 89 17 favorite using a

870
00:41:51,350 --> 00:41:55,100
password mind you that was on the battle

871
00:41:53,210 --> 00:41:57,530
an article that went out about two or

872
00:41:55,100 --> 00:42:00,650
three days before that SD magazine for

873
00:41:57,530 --> 00:42:03,170
security magazine but others posted by

874
00:42:00,650 --> 00:42:04,580
Kubrick on IRC that said that using the

875
00:42:03,170 --> 00:42:09,080
password manager was no better than

876
00:42:04,580 --> 00:42:11,330
using a text file which okay I don't

877
00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:14,960
know shelf good awesome Shiva

878
00:42:11,330 --> 00:42:18,259
it was my is you said that your are

879
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:19,640
missus edit info so yeah so I just

880
00:42:18,260 --> 00:42:22,600
wanted to set the record straight and

881
00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:27,500
yes I think the debate around to NFA is

882
00:42:22,600 --> 00:42:29,930
how good is good MFA versus weaker to FA

883
00:42:27,500 --> 00:42:34,220
so there is an argument that SMS based

884
00:42:29,930 --> 00:42:35,930
to FA is being adequate for my home it's

885
00:42:34,220 --> 00:42:37,609
adequate right because nobody's really

886
00:42:35,930 --> 00:42:39,440
going to go after my mom to get their

887
00:42:37,610 --> 00:42:42,950
credentials what's breaking order

888
00:42:39,440 --> 00:42:45,470
accounts he's not high-value target so

889
00:42:42,950 --> 00:42:49,250
the vast majority of people SMS based to

890
00:42:45,470 --> 00:42:52,100
FA is probably an equal to even though

891
00:42:49,250 --> 00:42:57,710
it's not ideal but it's better than not

892
00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:59,450
having anything and then responsible

893
00:42:57,710 --> 00:43:01,190
disclosure so who works for

894
00:42:59,450 --> 00:43:06,740
organizations that run responsible

895
00:43:01,190 --> 00:43:11,390
disclosure not so you know shop at that

896
00:43:06,740 --> 00:43:15,500
oh yeah yeah who's aware of what they

897
00:43:11,390 --> 00:43:18,770
are okay so now everybody so that's the

898
00:43:15,500 --> 00:43:23,150
idea that you give I and a security

899
00:43:18,770 --> 00:43:25,130
researcher or a hacker to notify you of

900
00:43:23,150 --> 00:43:27,350
a security vulnerability that they may

901
00:43:25,130 --> 00:43:29,900
have found on here winner or a PII or

902
00:43:27,350 --> 00:43:31,040
whatever and you give them a channel in

903
00:43:29,900 --> 00:43:35,480
which are they can tell you in a

904
00:43:31,040 --> 00:43:37,009
responsible way and they're very very

905
00:43:35,480 --> 00:43:38,960
supposed to do anything put a page on

906
00:43:37,010 --> 00:43:40,880
your website you can deploy a security

907
00:43:38,960 --> 00:43:42,950
dot txt file which hasn't started and

908
00:43:40,880 --> 00:43:44,990
they can go look for it behind it is an

909
00:43:42,950 --> 00:43:47,330
email address simply chosen the wrong

910
00:43:44,990 --> 00:43:49,100
ability and will do something about it

911
00:43:47,330 --> 00:43:51,140
key thing is that you do something about

912
00:43:49,100 --> 00:43:53,180
it if they care enough to tell you that

913
00:43:51,140 --> 00:43:55,609
you've got a problem and not happy then

914
00:43:53,180 --> 00:43:57,529
you've got a bit of an obligation to get

915
00:43:55,610 --> 00:44:00,830
back and patent for it and fix the

916
00:43:57,530 --> 00:44:01,200
you have you have some people who do

917
00:44:00,830 --> 00:44:03,210
this

918
00:44:01,200 --> 00:44:07,230
on the step so you have like birdies but

919
00:44:03,210 --> 00:44:09,030
you have some use ransom bonus so

920
00:44:07,230 --> 00:44:10,770
they'll email a company saying oh I

921
00:44:09,030 --> 00:44:11,940
found the best you in your product pay

922
00:44:10,770 --> 00:44:13,790
me some money I'll tell you about it

923
00:44:11,940 --> 00:44:17,220
which is not the right way to do it and

924
00:44:13,790 --> 00:44:18,869
so that's not to respond and that is not

925
00:44:17,220 --> 00:44:22,500
a responsible disclosure that's just

926
00:44:18,869 --> 00:44:23,460
being a dead irresponsible is

927
00:44:22,500 --> 00:44:27,240
irresponsible

928
00:44:23,460 --> 00:44:29,099
okay I'm not really mr. this disease is

929
00:44:27,240 --> 00:44:30,390
baby but it's a whole different scale

930
00:44:29,099 --> 00:44:33,119
affected dickish Ness

931
00:44:30,390 --> 00:44:34,980
so this is the concept here is elastic

932
00:44:33,119 --> 00:44:36,960
scoring an organization based on how

933
00:44:34,980 --> 00:44:39,359
well or badly they react to a public

934
00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:43,559
public announcement target well I never

935
00:44:39,359 --> 00:44:45,690
walk so people from network for PGP we

936
00:44:43,559 --> 00:44:50,099
reported actually to quite a bit harder

937
00:44:45,690 --> 00:44:52,619
by faster Priya then' occasional excuse

938
00:44:50,099 --> 00:44:55,230
me reported recently and the company

939
00:44:52,619 --> 00:44:58,740
came back to us and said yeah the

940
00:44:55,230 --> 00:45:00,780
product end-of-life so we went back to

941
00:44:58,740 --> 00:45:04,589
the website with all the people that

942
00:45:00,780 --> 00:45:06,030
were selling it on beyond it's still

943
00:45:04,589 --> 00:45:08,190
being after we saw we're about to it

944
00:45:06,030 --> 00:45:09,900
yeah but you actually selling like on a

945
00:45:08,190 --> 00:45:10,829
couple of a million different sites

946
00:45:09,900 --> 00:45:12,660
there

947
00:45:10,829 --> 00:45:15,569
oh no we only tell our customers at end

948
00:45:12,660 --> 00:45:17,670
of life of the ask wait that's not

949
00:45:15,569 --> 00:45:19,859
flexing the issue so we've gone back

950
00:45:17,670 --> 00:45:21,720
through one of them bigger partners and

951
00:45:19,859 --> 00:45:24,119
said look this this is the response of

952
00:45:21,720 --> 00:45:26,129
the vendor and the partners that come

953
00:45:24,119 --> 00:45:28,440
back because they'd be sale quite quite

954
00:45:26,130 --> 00:45:29,760
a lot of the the equipment and they're

955
00:45:28,440 --> 00:45:32,369
like well we're going to like cut a

956
00:45:29,760 --> 00:45:34,170
contract with it don't fix it so it's

957
00:45:32,369 --> 00:45:37,049
impactful but yeah that's that's

958
00:45:34,170 --> 00:45:43,470
probably a 35 points possible and lose

959
00:45:37,049 --> 00:45:44,849
your Fingal yes okay so that's the PC

960
00:45:43,470 --> 00:45:46,140
stuff and we're going to speed up a

961
00:45:44,849 --> 00:45:47,460
little bit because we're we're not we're

962
00:45:46,140 --> 00:45:50,670
not not regular time left

963
00:45:47,460 --> 00:45:52,349
but yeah pentest notice in technology

964
00:45:50,670 --> 00:45:54,510
software obviously now word on this year

965
00:45:52,349 --> 00:45:56,760
of research of fantastic people okay so

966
00:45:54,510 --> 00:45:58,580
people are most likely attack surface in

967
00:45:56,760 --> 00:46:01,250
an organization whether that's by

968
00:45:58,580 --> 00:46:02,900
they clicking a link again social

969
00:46:01,250 --> 00:46:04,400
engineer just all the way that's what's

970
00:46:02,900 --> 00:46:07,070
good holding a door open for someone

971
00:46:04,400 --> 00:46:10,190
yeah absolutely so fantastic building

972
00:46:07,070 --> 00:46:11,900
yeah yeah I'll just run you're also a

973
00:46:10,190 --> 00:46:13,790
fantastic night responding

974
00:46:11,900 --> 00:46:16,100
vulnerabilities it's also testing your

975
00:46:13,790 --> 00:46:24,220
procedures of standards of processes and

976
00:46:16,100 --> 00:46:24,220
making sure that those are working again

977
00:46:24,430 --> 00:46:28,399
though we bring an independent audience

978
00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:30,380
against them their career novelty

979
00:46:28,400 --> 00:46:32,000
company it's a really valuable thing

980
00:46:30,380 --> 00:46:33,620
don't be afraid of it don't be afraid of

981
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:36,500
a company coming in and telling you

982
00:46:33,620 --> 00:46:38,540
even when you pay to do it because then

983
00:46:36,500 --> 00:46:40,790
they're not your homework you can do all

984
00:46:38,540 --> 00:46:42,380
your own testing for all your viewpoints

985
00:46:40,790 --> 00:46:44,300
but your baseline is your own

986
00:46:42,380 --> 00:46:45,440
understanding of your company get

987
00:46:44,300 --> 00:46:47,630
someone else to come and do it as well

988
00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:49,100
because you can learn some really more

989
00:46:47,630 --> 00:46:53,150
things about your company that you were

990
00:46:49,100 --> 00:46:55,700
blissfully oh well really good said get

991
00:46:53,150 --> 00:46:57,920
involved in improving programs engage

992
00:46:55,700 --> 00:47:00,649
management engage people around the

993
00:46:57,920 --> 00:47:02,180
organization big security ends will be

994
00:47:00,650 --> 00:47:04,430
designed to thing building a software

995
00:47:02,180 --> 00:47:06,560
application building a network get your

996
00:47:04,430 --> 00:47:08,770
security considerations in at the

997
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:11,390
beginning and then bake them in okay

998
00:47:08,770 --> 00:47:13,790
patch stuff the entirely different

999
00:47:11,390 --> 00:47:15,770
subject to talk about yourself right but

1000
00:47:13,790 --> 00:47:17,320
don't be afraid of patching I hear it

1001
00:47:15,770 --> 00:47:20,120
actually is hard I understand it's hard

1002
00:47:17,320 --> 00:47:21,770
but it's because it's work just get on

1003
00:47:20,120 --> 00:47:23,810
with it do it because consequences of

1004
00:47:21,770 --> 00:47:26,120
not patching I could be far more severe

1005
00:47:23,810 --> 00:47:28,549
than the work and effort time and money

1006
00:47:26,120 --> 00:47:30,430
to party still what I would think that

1007
00:47:28,550 --> 00:47:32,780
if you're part some things in a

1008
00:47:30,430 --> 00:47:34,520
production environment do justify past

1009
00:47:32,780 --> 00:47:36,020
equation is something will fall

1010
00:47:34,520 --> 00:47:37,400
over some patch and development they

1011
00:47:36,020 --> 00:47:40,460
push the production when you know what

1012
00:47:37,400 --> 00:47:42,920
I've seen companies patch things in in

1013
00:47:40,460 --> 00:47:45,380
production and then all those systems

1014
00:47:42,920 --> 00:47:47,420
that don't assault doesn't why so tense

1015
00:47:45,380 --> 00:47:50,240
the test patch test patch test practice

1016
00:47:47,420 --> 00:47:52,100
yeah so on so forth definitely have a

1017
00:47:50,240 --> 00:47:53,779
matching program don't just do as a lot

1018
00:47:52,100 --> 00:47:55,759
operation make sure that you really are

1019
00:47:53,780 --> 00:47:57,440
regularly doing and don't just pass

1020
00:47:55,760 --> 00:47:59,060
before the pen testers cover that cuz

1021
00:47:57,440 --> 00:48:02,600
it's not how it works

1022
00:47:59,060 --> 00:48:04,430
no keep eyes on supply chains who saw

1023
00:48:02,600 --> 00:48:07,759
apps for British Airways there were the

1024
00:48:04,430 --> 00:48:09,609
upside-down jumbo jet I'm getting

1025
00:48:07,760 --> 00:48:11,650
involved in awareness campaigns in you

1026
00:48:09,610 --> 00:48:12,880
they talk about people I hate to turn

1027
00:48:11,650 --> 00:48:15,240
the people of the weakest link in

1028
00:48:12,880 --> 00:48:17,800
security else just okay okay

1029
00:48:15,240 --> 00:48:19,689
people are the likely it's at service

1030
00:48:17,800 --> 00:48:22,140
but that's the real education it's your

1031
00:48:19,690 --> 00:48:24,850
responsibility to what your modernity

1032
00:48:22,140 --> 00:48:26,950
have you been pawned yes you haven't we

1033
00:48:24,850 --> 00:48:28,390
well we well established that I drop

1034
00:48:26,950 --> 00:48:29,980
this slide in because it's useful in the

1035
00:48:28,390 --> 00:48:31,420
organization just to get something the

1036
00:48:29,980 --> 00:48:33,910
audience to voluntary and I dress

1037
00:48:31,420 --> 00:48:36,250
dropping into this service guarantee

1038
00:48:33,910 --> 00:48:39,069
will be every time it's quite powerful

1039
00:48:36,250 --> 00:48:45,910
okay you count me down we've been doing

1040
00:48:39,070 --> 00:48:50,290
yeah okay pretty well so how many is a

1041
00:48:45,910 --> 00:48:52,180
proper fact more secure can wait of

1042
00:48:50,290 --> 00:48:53,770
security program bug pony doesn't

1043
00:48:52,180 --> 00:48:57,270
replace pen testing pen testing this

1044
00:48:53,770 --> 00:49:00,430
book can run if you listen parallel

1045
00:48:57,270 --> 00:49:03,759
essentially you open your product for

1046
00:49:00,430 --> 00:49:05,919
your company up to external parties to

1047
00:49:03,760 --> 00:49:07,510
cover in hockey the difference between

1048
00:49:05,920 --> 00:49:09,610
bug burgers and pen testing and at the

1049
00:49:07,510 --> 00:49:12,150
top he says these that outlines it

1050
00:49:09,610 --> 00:49:15,490
entirely but essentially you have in

1051
00:49:12,150 --> 00:49:17,350
maybe hundreds maybe even thousands of

1052
00:49:15,490 --> 00:49:20,830
hackers look at your products and tell

1053
00:49:17,350 --> 00:49:22,509
you in chefs broken and return and you

1054
00:49:20,830 --> 00:49:24,490
should pay them some money

1055
00:49:22,510 --> 00:49:27,250
some companies give you internet points

1056
00:49:24,490 --> 00:49:29,140
internet going to pay the bills so so

1057
00:49:27,250 --> 00:49:31,030
I'm give me a t-shirts some someone give

1058
00:49:29,140 --> 00:49:33,730
me a t-shirt I mean there was a guy who

1059
00:49:31,030 --> 00:49:36,160
found your friends bug and Sony quite

1060
00:49:33,730 --> 00:49:38,550
quite sees what could it look cool

1061
00:49:36,160 --> 00:49:40,480
execution bug and they gave my t-shirt

1062
00:49:38,550 --> 00:49:42,700
whereas there's another company that

1063
00:49:40,480 --> 00:49:44,800
some of someone found a messin header so

1064
00:49:42,700 --> 00:49:47,649
there's like extreme options in the yen

1065
00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:48,880
100 params of voters so yeah there's

1066
00:49:47,650 --> 00:49:51,280
that's that's the difference between

1067
00:49:48,880 --> 00:49:53,050
signature you can have bugs and get

1068
00:49:51,280 --> 00:49:55,810
paid lots and good box and get page pop

1069
00:49:53,050 --> 00:49:57,310
out so there's good there's also a lot

1070
00:49:55,810 --> 00:49:59,620
of cool air learning opportunities for

1071
00:49:57,310 --> 00:50:01,330
security researchers people who are just

1072
00:49:59,620 --> 00:50:03,460
students and stuff it's easy money like

1073
00:50:01,330 --> 00:50:05,230
and I've made quite a few quid on my

1074
00:50:03,460 --> 00:50:07,660
pennies so me about had a part huh

1075
00:50:05,230 --> 00:50:10,040
they're quite big company if you haven't

1076
00:50:07,660 --> 00:50:12,480
don't google it

1077
00:50:10,040 --> 00:50:18,840
by phone quite a lot holes in the

1078
00:50:12,480 --> 00:50:22,200
website and some more security all those

1079
00:50:18,840 --> 00:50:24,060
words so much they're getting better

1080
00:50:22,200 --> 00:50:26,790
they start about medical program like

1081
00:50:24,060 --> 00:50:29,130
three years ago and they've know a lot

1082
00:50:26,790 --> 00:50:37,680
of holes but last of them are security

1083
00:50:29,130 --> 00:50:40,410
so okay thanks changes to set the policy

1084
00:50:37,680 --> 00:50:42,598
mounted institution by banks where they

1085
00:50:40,410 --> 00:50:44,819
suffer the same risks all use similar

1086
00:50:42,599 --> 00:50:47,849
software platforms that are all for its

1087
00:50:44,820 --> 00:50:49,109
fifty years of age they share a lot of

1088
00:50:47,849 --> 00:50:51,270
data about threat intelligence

1089
00:50:49,109 --> 00:50:54,869
throughout common attacks that they see

1090
00:50:51,270 --> 00:50:56,849
something the silicate involved it okay

1091
00:50:54,869 --> 00:50:59,690
five minutes left quick Whizzer do this

1092
00:50:56,849 --> 00:51:02,160
soon as the Anil exceed before breach

1093
00:50:59,690 --> 00:51:04,740
the point is it will happen to get ready

1094
00:51:02,160 --> 00:51:08,430
for it because that's what it's going to

1095
00:51:04,740 --> 00:51:12,390
feel like to begin with okay now we all

1096
00:51:08,430 --> 00:51:18,839
mess up but how we react to respond is

1097
00:51:12,390 --> 00:51:20,339
how we're defined and how early so when

1098
00:51:18,839 --> 00:51:22,230
it happens just admit it's happened

1099
00:51:20,339 --> 00:51:24,180
don't spend the first three days in

1100
00:51:22,230 --> 00:51:25,710
denial get on with it move into your

1101
00:51:24,180 --> 00:51:27,200
incision response don't blame somebody

1102
00:51:25,710 --> 00:51:29,700
else don't blame the Russian base

1103
00:51:27,200 --> 00:51:32,069
jihadist so I'm your hottest because

1104
00:51:29,700 --> 00:51:34,560
it's not likely to be then probably to

1105
00:51:32,070 --> 00:51:36,390
your faults seek support if you're gonna

1106
00:51:34,560 --> 00:51:38,970
look a local cert team like we've run

1107
00:51:36,390 --> 00:51:40,618
the UK the SSC don't be afraid they've

1108
00:51:38,970 --> 00:51:42,899
got 12 people and that will come in and

1109
00:51:40,619 --> 00:51:46,140
help you out okay you've got to notify

1110
00:51:42,900 --> 00:51:47,880
the authorities and doing not doing he's

1111
00:51:46,140 --> 00:51:49,859
gonna really hurt you get here

1112
00:51:47,880 --> 00:51:52,500
information package together and you've

1113
00:51:49,859 --> 00:51:54,869
got Leslie response provider

1114
00:51:52,500 --> 00:51:57,800
you've got 72 hours your concert buyer

1115
00:51:54,869 --> 00:52:00,330
you've got 24 hours not a lot of time

1116
00:51:57,800 --> 00:52:03,780
find out what happened and learn from it

1117
00:52:00,330 --> 00:52:05,790
that's really important and improve take

1118
00:52:03,780 --> 00:52:09,420
it on the chin you'll feel a lot better

1119
00:52:05,790 --> 00:52:12,420
for it so your customers yeah quick just

1120
00:52:09,420 --> 00:52:16,849
a great program yeah I've heard about

1121
00:52:12,420 --> 00:52:19,619
the Beechworth discuss a while that

1122
00:52:16,849 --> 00:52:22,799
nobody he heard the beach will a

1123
00:52:19,619 --> 00:52:26,249
crevasse the difference between

1124
00:52:22,799 --> 00:52:28,559
to discuss handled correctly Equifax

1125
00:52:26,249 --> 00:52:31,439
didn't and that kind of proves the point

1126
00:52:28,559 --> 00:52:35,670
deal with read correctly you'll come up

1127
00:52:31,439 --> 00:52:38,910
for them then how was in the title

1128
00:52:35,670 --> 00:52:42,059
bridge and that at that occasion was

1129
00:52:38,910 --> 00:52:43,890
temporary alum detailed email but it was

1130
00:52:42,059 --> 00:52:44,640
yeah we didn't we up but here's

1131
00:52:43,890 --> 00:52:46,259
what happened

1132
00:52:44,640 --> 00:52:51,900
his little bit is make sure never

1133
00:52:46,259 --> 00:52:53,189
happens again gonna leave Mendes out can

1134
00:52:51,900 --> 00:52:56,579
involve in the community guys that's

1135
00:52:53,189 --> 00:52:59,489
what it's all about and our medium is no

1136
00:52:56,579 --> 00:53:01,890
Armenian is presenting using a medium is

1137
00:52:59,489 --> 00:53:05,359
music causes yeah but we are active on

1138
00:53:01,890 --> 00:53:08,489
Twitter we write with blog a lot of time

1139
00:53:05,359 --> 00:53:10,348
so just just a quick annoying list quick

1140
00:53:08,489 --> 00:53:12,059
pitch I wrote a book

1141
00:53:10,349 --> 00:53:13,709
I've got a few physical copies with me

1142
00:53:12,059 --> 00:53:18,599
is what the initial spike words you want

1143
00:53:13,709 --> 00:53:25,678
to borrow I need to also did use officer

1144
00:53:18,599 --> 00:53:27,299
Cassidy by lottery okay so that's it

1145
00:53:25,679 --> 00:53:29,479
we're in a bad man as thank you very

1146
00:53:27,299 --> 00:53:29,479
much