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[Music]

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i'm daniel oscar

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born in germany

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and living in the netherlands already

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since 2006

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currently living in nineveh here working

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for the hardport university

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and yeah as already mentioned i want to

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tell you about emma and verifiable

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credentials and

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subtitles how to authenticate in a

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decentralized privacy friendly and more

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reliable manner

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across

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systems

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so first i want to talk about the

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one of the current issues with

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identity management

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that is it's centralized in

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traditionally

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so i give one example this is one model

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but there are also other models but

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for now let's keep it also simple

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and um

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yeah this is me

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i want to authenticate or request the

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service at my health insurer vgz

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which is the service provider in this

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case

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and

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so i was requesting a service and in

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order to be able to access the service i

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need to authenticate and how does this

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work in the netherlands

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usually

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the service provider asks

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dgd which is the identity provider one

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of the identity providers in the

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netherlands owned by the government

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to authenticate to certain services

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and

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so the service provider asks dgd is this

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really daniel

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and

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then i need to authenticate

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at dgt and dgd then gives okay to the

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service provider that i'm indeed

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daniel

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so in case of extreme events

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we clearly see that this central party

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the identity provider dgt is one of the

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bottlenecks

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because we have seen in the past that

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there were

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denial of service

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attacks also on dgt and it was not

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available for some time

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and also quality of service issues

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so

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their researchers and industry are

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working on solutions worldwide

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one of them is

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emra standing for i reveal my attributes

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developed at radboat university

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some years ago

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and it advertises itself on their

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website with having the digital passport

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on your phone

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currently it's maintained

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by scdn

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which is also responsible for

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maintaining the nl domain and um

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yeah one of the interesting things about

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emr is that it's completely open source

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so you can look up all the source code

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on github

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and

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it implements partly

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the ibm's

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itemx specification

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that itemx stands for identity mixer and

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it's a cryptographic protocol suite for

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privacy preserving

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authentication

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if you want to learn more

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about

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the

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implementation of edemics within yema

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then i invite you to go to the talk in

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the evening of maya and zitsel also

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sitting here

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which will tell you at 9pm today in the

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abacus

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about ems eta mix implementations the

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crypto behind selective unnegligible

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attribute disclosure

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so how does ima then work and also

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similar systems

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we have two independent processes

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first the issuance and second the

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disclosure

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first doing issuance

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for instance the government in the

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netherlands can issue me

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a personal data credential which

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consists of my name

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my birth date and for instance also my

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address

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so this credential will then after i

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authenticate to the government with dgd

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will be transferred to my phone

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and

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me

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as the owner of the credential is

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then yeah can

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can disclose this credit to whenever i

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want

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a credential consists

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of a certain

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[Music]

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properties so first

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it's bound to the phone

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via some cryptographic tricks

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and

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it contains metadata from which issuer

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it's issued for instance the dutch

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government

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also when it was issued and when the

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credential expires

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also

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logically it contains then attributes

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and most importantly also the issuer's

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signature because the issuer signs

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all attributes

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such that

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another party the verifier can

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verify that the

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credential and the containing attributes

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are indeed

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valid and issued by that issuer

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so if i now want to use those

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credentials

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um

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i can go to service provider and the

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service provider request then that i

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need to prove something for instance

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that i'm above 18 years old so where do

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i need to

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want to disclose such information for

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instance when

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i want to buy some liquor at the

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so the challenge is in this case a

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service provider

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and

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he wants to know that i'm indeed above

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18 years old

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so the trust model in this case is that

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trusts the government that the

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government issues

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valid

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credentials to the rightful citizen

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however during

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doing disclosure

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the helen hall does not need to talk

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with the government so this is privacy

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preserving in that sense that the

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government

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doesn't learn as identity provider when

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i use the credential in question

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so that's one of the advantages of this

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decentralized identity model

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so zooming a bit in

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how does a session in emr work

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first

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we go to

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a website and i chose now to have an

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example of verifier

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the verifier then starts a session at

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the ema server which this verifier can

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run himself

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after initiating the session

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at the emma server the email server

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returns some session information and

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based on the session information the

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verifier can create and show a qr code

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to the user

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then the user scan cqr code

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so the emr app

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gets information about the session

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and

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subsequently the email app also

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requests the information which

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attributes need to be disclosed

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and then the user can choose

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with an email it's possible to also make

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a construction that a user has a choice

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which attributes to this close

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and

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yeah then he can select in the app and

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disclose

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the attributes

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and then in the end the verifier can

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look up at the ems server if

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the disclosure was indeed successful and

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valid

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now one practical use case i want to

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refer to because i'm currently working

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on it

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is a postcard

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it's um

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we

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with in postcard we have the goal to

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make email encryption accessible

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for everybody is easy to use

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yeah we all know the issues the

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usability issues with open pgp right

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and

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how we do that is by utilizing identity

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based or attribute-based

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encryption

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in this concept we have a private key

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generator which is a trusted third party

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so

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that's also an issue we'll talk about it

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in a second

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and

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if alice wants to encrypt

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for her doctor bob for instance um

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she just needs the identity of bob for

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instance his email address and some

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attribute related to that he is a doctor

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and the public key of the public key

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generator

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and then alice can encrypt the mail

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then we ship the mail via our well-known

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smtp protocol to to bob

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but all the payload is encrypted during

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transport

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and bob can then decrypt

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by

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proving his identity via emr to the

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private key generator

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and if the private key generator then

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validates the disclosure it generates a

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user secret key

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that matches the identity with which

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ellis

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encrypted

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and then bob can decrypt

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the email

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so this decentralized and user-centric

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identity

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uh systems are also referred to

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nowadays more often as self-serving

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identity systems christopher ellen

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published

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an article in 2016 uh titled the path to

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self-serving identity

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where he also lists ten different

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principles

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such a system should adhere to

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unfortunately it's also often associated

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with distributed ledger technology

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because

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the bigger parties such as ibm

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really uses it for marketing purposes to

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sell their

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distributed ledger technology more

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more recently

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in germany there were some projects

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called id wallet and the digital school

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certificates based on distributed ledger

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technologies

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and the principles of self-serving

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identity but

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as we've seen those projects failed at

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the moment

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so they are not online anymore and yeah

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i think they will further work on it but

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also the

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bonus central physicists in the

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information technology the bsi

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discourages the use of distributed

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ledger technologies in

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such decentralized user-centric

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identity systems

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also interestingly

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recently

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the european union

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announced that there is a european

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digital identity initiative

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there is still a call for proposals the

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deadline is on the 17th of august

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22

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and they asked for

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yeah

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yeah the industry and researchers to

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submit solutions

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per country

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and

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00:12:07,279 --> 00:12:10,000
with the goal to have per country maybe

302
00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:11,839
one one system

303
00:12:11,839 --> 00:12:14,320
deployed in the end and that those

304
00:12:14,320 --> 00:12:17,040
systems are then interoperable so so if

305
00:12:17,040 --> 00:12:19,120
i now travel with my credentials to

306
00:12:19,120 --> 00:12:21,440
germany that i can also use my

307
00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:23,839
dutch credentials in germany to

308
00:12:23,839 --> 00:12:26,000
authenticate and for example to prove

309
00:12:26,000 --> 00:12:29,519
that i'm above 18 years old

310
00:12:30,160 --> 00:12:31,120
also

311
00:12:31,120 --> 00:12:35,040
yema is also participating in this

312
00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:39,279
so there is also some discussion

313
00:12:39,279 --> 00:12:41,440
especially in germany um that there are

314
00:12:41,440 --> 00:12:43,839
also some drawbacks with self-serving

315
00:12:43,839 --> 00:12:45,360
identity or decentralized and

316
00:12:45,360 --> 00:12:48,560
user-centric identity systems in general

317
00:12:48,560 --> 00:12:51,519
um some of those arguments are nicely

318
00:12:51,519 --> 00:12:53,519
written down by lily redmond my german

319
00:12:53,519 --> 00:12:55,920
friends here will probably

320
00:12:55,920 --> 00:12:59,360
heard about her in the last two years

321
00:12:59,360 --> 00:13:01,279
also and

322
00:13:01,279 --> 00:13:03,279
she argues that with self-serving

323
00:13:03,279 --> 00:13:06,079
identity systems service providers have

324
00:13:06,079 --> 00:13:09,519
verified verified data stored

325
00:13:09,519 --> 00:13:11,279
and those are more valuable for

326
00:13:11,279 --> 00:13:13,760
criminals

327
00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:15,839
also once you have such

328
00:13:15,839 --> 00:13:18,959
an infrastructure deployed it's also

329
00:13:18,959 --> 00:13:21,440
easier to add identification obligations

330
00:13:21,440 --> 00:13:24,240
in the future

331
00:13:24,959 --> 00:13:26,959
also states often leave it to the market

332
00:13:26,959 --> 00:13:28,320
to develop

333
00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:29,760
solutions

334
00:13:29,760 --> 00:13:31,120
and then the question is okay what's

335
00:13:31,120 --> 00:13:33,200
what's the business model then

336
00:13:33,200 --> 00:13:34,480
for those

337
00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:36,240
organizations right how do i want to

338
00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:38,320
earn money with the identity do we want

339
00:13:38,320 --> 00:13:39,360
that

340
00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:41,920
as a society

341
00:13:41,920 --> 00:13:42,880
and

342
00:13:42,880 --> 00:13:45,040
yeah citizens are then becoming

343
00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:46,720
responsible for

344
00:13:46,720 --> 00:13:48,320
maintaining their credentials within

345
00:13:48,320 --> 00:13:49,839
their phone so

346
00:13:49,839 --> 00:13:51,680
what happens if someone commits fault

347
00:13:51,680 --> 00:13:53,279
with them who's

348
00:13:53,279 --> 00:13:56,000
liable for this

349
00:13:58,160 --> 00:14:00,320
one of the goals of the european digital

350
00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:01,680
identity

351
00:14:01,680 --> 00:14:04,320
was to make such platforms interoperable

352
00:14:04,320 --> 00:14:06,639
right what i said so you can go from

353
00:14:06,639 --> 00:14:08,240
travel from germany to the netherlands

354
00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:09,519
and then use the

355
00:14:09,519 --> 00:14:11,360
credential from one country in another

356
00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:13,760
country

357
00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:14,800
so

358
00:14:14,800 --> 00:14:17,360
one of the current issues is that

359
00:14:17,360 --> 00:14:20,399
there is no standard defined how

360
00:14:20,399 --> 00:14:23,040
different identity apps such as emi it's

361
00:14:23,040 --> 00:14:26,560
me slus or the american sovereign

362
00:14:26,560 --> 00:14:28,839
talk to each other right how to exchange

363
00:14:28,839 --> 00:14:31,680
credentials between systems such that i

364
00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:33,920
can for instance have my personal data

365
00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:36,000
credential from ems

366
00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:39,199
stored within my yema app and someone

367
00:14:39,199 --> 00:14:41,600
deploys an it's me server

368
00:14:41,600 --> 00:14:45,120
and then can verify my ema credentials

369
00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:49,040
within an it's me system

370
00:14:50,079 --> 00:14:51,360
this

371
00:14:51,360 --> 00:14:54,959
w3c the worldwide web consortium

372
00:14:54,959 --> 00:14:56,639
developed a

373
00:14:56,639 --> 00:14:59,120
standard called verifiable credentials

374
00:14:59,120 --> 00:15:01,120
data model

375
00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:03,600
and it became a recommendation

376
00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:05,920
version 1.0 in

377
00:15:05,920 --> 00:15:09,199
may 2020 i think

378
00:15:09,199 --> 00:15:11,120
and in the meantime they also updated

379
00:15:11,120 --> 00:15:14,639
some minor things so it became a 1.1

380
00:15:14,639 --> 00:15:16,160
version

381
00:15:16,160 --> 00:15:17,279
um

382
00:15:17,279 --> 00:15:19,839
so important to see here is that

383
00:15:19,839 --> 00:15:22,399
this proposal contains a data model

384
00:15:22,399 --> 00:15:23,760
which is an

385
00:15:23,760 --> 00:15:27,440
unambiguous specification defining walls

386
00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:29,600
the interaction between walls and

387
00:15:29,600 --> 00:15:31,360
related concepts

388
00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:33,920
and also providing a syntax usually in

389
00:15:33,920 --> 00:15:35,920
json so we will

390
00:15:35,920 --> 00:15:40,279
i will give a little example in a bit

391
00:15:40,639 --> 00:15:42,480
so if we now look at the walls and

392
00:15:42,480 --> 00:15:45,279
information flow of the verifiable

393
00:15:45,279 --> 00:15:47,199
credentials data model we see clearly

394
00:15:47,199 --> 00:15:49,519
some similarities with the yammer system

395
00:15:49,519 --> 00:15:52,079
right we have here an issuer that issues

396
00:15:52,079 --> 00:15:53,519
credentials

397
00:15:53,519 --> 00:15:56,079
we have a holder or a user that needs to

398
00:15:56,079 --> 00:15:57,920
store the credentials in a within a

399
00:15:57,920 --> 00:15:59,920
wallet app on the phone

400
00:15:59,920 --> 00:16:02,320
then we have a verifier on the right and

401
00:16:02,320 --> 00:16:05,120
that yeah requests credentials and

402
00:16:05,120 --> 00:16:06,959
verifies them

403
00:16:06,959 --> 00:16:08,720
and on the bottom we see we have a

404
00:16:08,720 --> 00:16:11,040
verified data registry that maintains

405
00:16:11,040 --> 00:16:13,120
identifiers and schemes so i didn't talk

406
00:16:13,120 --> 00:16:16,800
about this yet but i will do in a bit

407
00:16:16,800 --> 00:16:18,560
and

408
00:16:18,560 --> 00:16:21,199
within yammer yeah we have the similar

409
00:16:21,199 --> 00:16:23,839
concepts

410
00:16:24,480 --> 00:16:26,800
so an emr scheme is

411
00:16:26,800 --> 00:16:28,480
very important because it contains

412
00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:30,560
information about the issuer

413
00:16:30,560 --> 00:16:33,440
which credentials an issuer may issue

414
00:16:33,440 --> 00:16:35,759
and also the public keys

415
00:16:35,759 --> 00:16:37,519
of the issuers

416
00:16:37,519 --> 00:16:38,320
that

417
00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:40,959
a verifier needs to be able

418
00:16:40,959 --> 00:16:42,240
to

419
00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:45,040
verify that the credentials are indeed

420
00:16:45,040 --> 00:16:47,519
developed

421
00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:51,759
so the emr scheme is distributed via the

422
00:16:51,759 --> 00:16:55,120
ems key manager so it's hosted on github

423
00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:56,000
and

424
00:16:56,000 --> 00:16:57,040
every

425
00:16:57,040 --> 00:16:59,120
instance of an ems

426
00:16:59,120 --> 00:17:02,560
service or the yemi app regularly

427
00:17:02,560 --> 00:17:05,599
pulls the most recent version of the

428
00:17:05,599 --> 00:17:08,160
official emr scheme

429
00:17:08,160 --> 00:17:12,240
so it stays up to date

430
00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:15,119
however in the

431
00:17:15,119 --> 00:17:16,799
verified credential

432
00:17:16,799 --> 00:17:19,119
data model

433
00:17:19,119 --> 00:17:20,799
the the yes

434
00:17:20,799 --> 00:17:23,199
it works a bit differently so for

435
00:17:23,199 --> 00:17:25,520
instance as you can see here the the

436
00:17:25,520 --> 00:17:26,799
green row

437
00:17:26,799 --> 00:17:28,480
within

438
00:17:28,480 --> 00:17:30,240
within this accept

439
00:17:30,240 --> 00:17:33,280
example we see a url

440
00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:34,559
that links

441
00:17:34,559 --> 00:17:37,600
to yeah if d referenced contains some

442
00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:39,919
information about the issuer

443
00:17:39,919 --> 00:17:41,600
and i think most importantly contains

444
00:17:41,600 --> 00:17:43,760
the public key of the issuer so

445
00:17:43,760 --> 00:17:45,760
anyone receiving this credential can

446
00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:48,400
verify it

447
00:17:51,360 --> 00:17:54,320
so what i did within

448
00:17:54,320 --> 00:17:57,440
within my work is developing a metadata

449
00:17:57,440 --> 00:17:58,559
server

450
00:17:58,559 --> 00:18:00,559
within the emr system

451
00:18:00,559 --> 00:18:02,240
such that

452
00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:06,320
external parties can request information

453
00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:07,760
about the issuer and about the

454
00:18:07,760 --> 00:18:09,600
credentials used

455
00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:12,320
by offering two distinct endpoints the

456
00:18:12,320 --> 00:18:15,840
issuer and the schema endpoint

457
00:18:16,720 --> 00:18:19,919
yeah so we can conform to the verifiable

458
00:18:19,919 --> 00:18:23,039
credential data model

459
00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:27,760
so the prototype are built

460
00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:30,480
to summarize is providing this metadata

461
00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:31,919
server

462
00:18:31,919 --> 00:18:35,280
a wrapper with an emr go yamago is a

463
00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:38,720
central component with which you can

464
00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:40,799
run an emr server but also parts are

465
00:18:40,799 --> 00:18:41,840
used

466
00:18:41,840 --> 00:18:43,280
within

467
00:18:43,280 --> 00:18:45,600
the app

468
00:18:45,600 --> 00:18:47,919
to compute verifiable credential

469
00:18:47,919 --> 00:18:50,400
compliant messages

470
00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:52,720
also i show that we can exchange

471
00:18:52,720 --> 00:18:54,799
verifiable credential compliant messages

472
00:18:54,799 --> 00:18:57,280
between different emma components

473
00:18:57,280 --> 00:19:00,880
so doing my study i was not able due to

474
00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:03,600
time constraints to find other parties

475
00:19:03,600 --> 00:19:06,240
for instance it's me or soviet that want

476
00:19:06,240 --> 00:19:08,559
to work together with me to

477
00:19:08,559 --> 00:19:11,200
to show that we can indeed exchange

478
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:12,720
information

479
00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:16,000
between different systems

480
00:19:18,080 --> 00:19:20,960
so the source code is also available on

481
00:19:20,960 --> 00:19:23,440
my github i forked the emrgo and the

482
00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:26,960
emma mobile repositories

483
00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:29,200
and

484
00:19:30,320 --> 00:19:32,160
to to wrap it up

485
00:19:32,160 --> 00:19:36,280
i think all the time

486
00:19:38,080 --> 00:19:38,799
so

487
00:19:38,799 --> 00:19:40,880
what i just said the prototype showers

488
00:19:40,880 --> 00:19:44,240
how to compute vc compliant messages

489
00:19:44,240 --> 00:19:46,320
within yema

490
00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:48,799
by conforming to the verified credential

491
00:19:48,799 --> 00:19:51,760
data model ema's interval

492
00:19:51,760 --> 00:19:54,640
interoperability increases however one

493
00:19:54,640 --> 00:19:56,000
of the most

494
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:58,320
important things to discuss though is

495
00:19:58,320 --> 00:19:59,760
that

496
00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:03,039
the apis and the cryptos

497
00:20:03,039 --> 00:20:05,280
a system implements can defer in each

498
00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:07,760
system and that's also the biggest

499
00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:09,440
challenge

500
00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:11,520
and that's yeah for instance emr

501
00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:13,280
utilizes

502
00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:17,679
the ib ibm's identity mix specification

503
00:20:17,679 --> 00:20:20,080
to to implement some protocols but other

504
00:20:20,080 --> 00:20:22,960
system can implement other crypto

505
00:20:22,960 --> 00:20:23,840
so

506
00:20:23,840 --> 00:20:25,360
how do you make sure each system

507
00:20:25,360 --> 00:20:26,720
understand

508
00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:29,039
crypto of all the other systems right i

509
00:20:29,039 --> 00:20:31,120
think that's one of the most

510
00:20:31,120 --> 00:20:33,280
complicated things

511
00:20:33,280 --> 00:20:36,720
in this whole yeah very very credential

512
00:20:36,720 --> 00:20:39,280
um yeah standard

513
00:20:39,280 --> 00:20:40,880
but i think we have a similar discussion

514
00:20:40,880 --> 00:20:42,400
currently about

515
00:20:42,400 --> 00:20:45,120
making messenger apps interoperable i

516
00:20:45,120 --> 00:20:46,880
think there we have kind of the similar

517
00:20:46,880 --> 00:20:49,840
challenges

518
00:20:50,559 --> 00:20:53,678
so on a more higher level

519
00:20:53,919 --> 00:20:56,480
we can state that with decentral

520
00:20:56,480 --> 00:20:58,559
identity management platforms we can

521
00:20:58,559 --> 00:21:01,280
improve the reliability

522
00:21:01,280 --> 00:21:03,280
doing extreme events

523
00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:04,799
because we are not relying on the

524
00:21:04,799 --> 00:21:08,799
central identity provider

525
00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:11,120
there are also several

526
00:21:11,120 --> 00:21:13,120
decentralized and user-centric products

527
00:21:13,120 --> 00:21:14,960
available on the market as we've seen

528
00:21:14,960 --> 00:21:17,280
emr for instance in schloss in the

529
00:21:17,280 --> 00:21:19,679
netherlands and it's me

530
00:21:19,679 --> 00:21:22,159
in belgium which is really used heavily

531
00:21:22,159 --> 00:21:25,919
there by citizens

532
00:21:27,200 --> 00:21:29,360
yeah the bsi

533
00:21:29,360 --> 00:21:31,600
states that it doesn't recommend the use

534
00:21:31,600 --> 00:21:34,799
of distributed ledger technology within

535
00:21:34,799 --> 00:21:36,720
such systems

536
00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:38,159
um

537
00:21:38,159 --> 00:21:40,640
in in we have seen that

538
00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:43,280
systems use it for like storing also a

539
00:21:43,280 --> 00:21:44,960
scheme right so in a decentralized

540
00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:47,200
manner they try to distribute

541
00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:50,080
the scheme such that everybody can

542
00:21:50,080 --> 00:21:52,720
receive the right information about

543
00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:56,640
issuers for instance the public keys

544
00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:58,880
and yeah in the end we have the european

545
00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:00,240
digital

546
00:22:00,240 --> 00:22:02,799
identity initiative

547
00:22:02,799 --> 00:22:05,039
it gives opportunities to empower

548
00:22:05,039 --> 00:22:07,120
citizens to be in control and sole

549
00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:10,159
control of their identity

550
00:22:10,159 --> 00:22:12,559
but as i have shown there are also some

551
00:22:12,559 --> 00:22:14,880
drawbacks that we still need to address

552
00:22:14,880 --> 00:22:16,880
so i also

553
00:22:16,880 --> 00:22:19,440
it's a call to action for everybody here

554
00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:21,039
who wants that this goes in the right

555
00:22:21,039 --> 00:22:22,240
direction

556
00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:24,159
because within the european union it was

557
00:22:24,159 --> 00:22:26,720
also one point was that we have some

558
00:22:26,720 --> 00:22:28,799
unique identifier for every citizen

559
00:22:28,799 --> 00:22:32,559
within europe so that we can have yeah

560
00:22:32,559 --> 00:22:33,440
uh

561
00:22:33,440 --> 00:22:36,880
can identify everyone and i think we

562
00:22:36,880 --> 00:22:39,360
we don't want that

563
00:22:39,360 --> 00:22:41,360
as a community here at least

564
00:22:41,360 --> 00:22:42,640
and

565
00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:44,799
yeah that's the end of my

566
00:22:44,799 --> 00:22:47,520
talk and so we still have some time for

567
00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:50,918
a q a

568
00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:57,600
so thank you very much and if there are

569
00:22:57,600 --> 00:22:59,280
any questions please line up at the

570
00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:02,879
microphones in the middle of the room

571
00:23:03,360 --> 00:23:05,919
we do have some time if anyone wants to

572
00:23:05,919 --> 00:23:09,159
know anything

573
00:23:13,360 --> 00:23:14,799
okay

574
00:23:14,799 --> 00:23:17,679
first front microphone please hi you

575
00:23:17,679 --> 00:23:19,600
mentioned and it's on the slide

576
00:23:19,600 --> 00:23:21,520
the distributed ledger is not

577
00:23:21,520 --> 00:23:23,440
recommended by the bsi

578
00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:25,360
could you tell a little bit more about

579
00:23:25,360 --> 00:23:28,000
that about the whys and

580
00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:30,640
the whys yeah because they argue that

581
00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:31,679
the

582
00:23:31,679 --> 00:23:34,480
technology is not major enough and

583
00:23:34,480 --> 00:23:37,840
it gives more risk than it benefits

584
00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:40,640
an actual system so i don't have all the

585
00:23:40,640 --> 00:23:43,039
details now in mind but i referenced it

586
00:23:43,039 --> 00:23:44,799
so

587
00:23:44,799 --> 00:23:46,640
yeah i ask you then to to look up if you

588
00:23:46,640 --> 00:23:48,240
really want to know all the details what

589
00:23:48,240 --> 00:23:51,440
what they write in their report so

590
00:23:51,440 --> 00:23:52,480
yeah

591
00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:55,760
that's okay next question

592
00:23:55,760 --> 00:23:58,960
hello and thank you for your talk

593
00:23:58,960 --> 00:24:01,840
let's assume that everyone

594
00:24:01,840 --> 00:24:03,360
every wallet

595
00:24:03,360 --> 00:24:06,080
now has those verifiable potentials we

596
00:24:06,080 --> 00:24:08,480
don't have interoperability yet

597
00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:10,159
what would you recommend how should the

598
00:24:10,159 --> 00:24:13,200
wallets then work together

599
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:15,679
if we don't have interoperability you

600
00:24:15,679 --> 00:24:16,480
mean

601
00:24:16,480 --> 00:24:19,279
let's assume we all implemented this and

602
00:24:19,279 --> 00:24:21,120
it's just a standard and you know there

603
00:24:21,120 --> 00:24:22,559
are still limits you don't have the

604
00:24:22,559 --> 00:24:25,360
interoperability just by implementing

605
00:24:25,360 --> 00:24:28,799
the standard so what if we now have all

606
00:24:28,799 --> 00:24:30,880
those verifiable credentials how should

607
00:24:30,880 --> 00:24:32,640
we continue

608
00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:35,279
to actually get interoperability yeah

609
00:24:35,279 --> 00:24:37,440
exactly so to increase interoperability

610
00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:39,679
even further so i think

611
00:24:39,679 --> 00:24:42,000
what we need is some agreement within

612
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:44,559
the community also to

613
00:24:44,559 --> 00:24:46,640
think about which kind of crypto we want

614
00:24:46,640 --> 00:24:48,720
to support what's what is really the

615
00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:51,440
good quip um for instance right what

616
00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:53,279
yama currently implements

617
00:24:53,279 --> 00:24:56,640
uh parts of the identity mixer of ibm

618
00:24:56,640 --> 00:24:58,720
that we kind of standardize this and

619
00:24:58,720 --> 00:25:00,720
make it kind of a library so other

620
00:25:00,720 --> 00:25:02,799
systems can just load this library and

621
00:25:02,799 --> 00:25:04,880
then have the crypto

622
00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:06,799
included in the system already so i

623
00:25:06,799 --> 00:25:07,840
think

624
00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:09,760
it needs to go into that direction that

625
00:25:09,760 --> 00:25:12,480
we have some agreement on the good

626
00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:14,720
crypto and then maybe

627
00:25:14,720 --> 00:25:17,360
have different libraries that implement

628
00:25:17,360 --> 00:25:20,159
this different cryptographic systems

629
00:25:20,159 --> 00:25:21,760
so other

630
00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:24,159
i didn't yeah other

631
00:25:24,159 --> 00:25:26,720
decentralized systems can easily

632
00:25:26,720 --> 00:25:30,640
implement it or use it let's say right

633
00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:32,720
okay next one

634
00:25:32,720 --> 00:25:34,400
hello

635
00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:35,200
i

636
00:25:35,200 --> 00:25:37,520
would like to

637
00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:40,400
know i have to remin remind you that

638
00:25:40,400 --> 00:25:43,039
we had a talk about bring your own

639
00:25:43,039 --> 00:25:44,320
identity

640
00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:46,799
on the on friday

641
00:25:46,799 --> 00:25:49,520
which allowed

642
00:25:49,520 --> 00:25:52,159
authentication on any server by using

643
00:25:52,159 --> 00:25:55,120
one identity provider and maybe a week

644
00:25:55,120 --> 00:25:56,960
after this talk we can have a little

645
00:25:56,960 --> 00:25:58,240
chat

646
00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:01,279
how your irma project can

647
00:26:01,279 --> 00:26:03,919
coincide with my hair is our bring your

648
00:26:03,919 --> 00:26:05,760
own identity project

649
00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:09,039
and the designer of uh offer bring your

650
00:26:09,039 --> 00:26:11,440
own identity will

651
00:26:11,440 --> 00:26:14,720
be here in in a while and maybe that's

652
00:26:14,720 --> 00:26:17,360
interesting because what we did

653
00:26:17,360 --> 00:26:19,279
we created a system

654
00:26:19,279 --> 00:26:20,559
that

655
00:26:20,559 --> 00:26:22,799
to prevent to have to authentic to have

656
00:26:22,799 --> 00:26:24,799
credentials on all those servers such as

657
00:26:24,799 --> 00:26:25,679
google

658
00:26:25,679 --> 00:26:27,520
facebook and so on

659
00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:28,559
to be

660
00:26:28,559 --> 00:26:31,200
removed and be delegated to your own

661
00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:33,840
identity provider and because this talk

662
00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:36,720
is also very much about identity maybe

663
00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:39,840
they're interesting

664
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:42,480
coincidences so to speak

665
00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:44,880
but it's not really a question but yeah

666
00:26:44,880 --> 00:26:47,760
maybe i want to point out maybe

667
00:26:47,760 --> 00:26:49,919
something can be combined with your with

668
00:26:49,919 --> 00:26:52,400
irma and bringing own identity

669
00:26:52,400 --> 00:26:54,000
but if i understand correctly you say

670
00:26:54,000 --> 00:26:56,159
that you then have different your

671
00:26:56,159 --> 00:26:58,960
identity stored at one identity provider

672
00:26:58,960 --> 00:27:01,039
but then it's also centralized in a way

673
00:27:01,039 --> 00:27:03,279
right so that's also risk

674
00:27:03,279 --> 00:27:05,360
indeed whatever thinking of it it's also

675
00:27:05,360 --> 00:27:07,120
a problem because when the identity

676
00:27:07,120 --> 00:27:09,520
provider goes down you can't identify

677
00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,440
anymore but that's what you solved

678
00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:14,080
center maybe that can be combined

679
00:27:14,080 --> 00:27:17,200
yeah okay maybe we can talk later also

680
00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:18,399
yeah

681
00:27:18,399 --> 00:27:19,600
yeah

682
00:27:19,600 --> 00:27:23,279
so so uh apologies if i miss uh i missed

683
00:27:23,279 --> 00:27:25,200
most of your talk but um

684
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:27,120
the uh so i was paying attention to

685
00:27:27,120 --> 00:27:29,360
these verifiable claims work attached to

686
00:27:29,360 --> 00:27:32,240
the w3c from pretty early because i had

687
00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:33,520
somebody dragged me into being involved

688
00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:36,799
in the um in the e payments thing

689
00:27:36,799 --> 00:27:37,840
um

690
00:27:37,840 --> 00:27:39,440
the

691
00:27:39,440 --> 00:27:40,240
the

692
00:27:40,240 --> 00:27:41,520
okay there was a lot of incompetence

693
00:27:41,520 --> 00:27:44,000
there from the beginning but um

694
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:45,919
but one of the things that kind of stuck

695
00:27:45,919 --> 00:27:49,600
out to me and apologies again if you've

696
00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:52,000
already touched on this but

697
00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:55,520
you really don't want uh any identity

698
00:27:55,520 --> 00:27:58,000
system that is sort of general purpose

699
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,399
and relocatable against different things

700
00:28:00,399 --> 00:28:03,600
and that reveals attributes of people

701
00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:05,279
uh so

702
00:28:05,279 --> 00:28:06,720
one of if you go through like the

703
00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:09,360
verifiable claims like the the their

704
00:28:09,360 --> 00:28:10,480
documents

705
00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:12,080
if you go through like their either use

706
00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:14,840
cases documents it talks about

707
00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:17,039
um it talks about using like for example

708
00:28:17,039 --> 00:28:18,480
to prove you have a job to get a bank

709
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:19,600
account

710
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:21,840
which okay that's fine but how often do

711
00:28:21,840 --> 00:28:23,360
you open a bank account it's perfectly

712
00:28:23,360 --> 00:28:25,679
fine to ask your employer for a letter

713
00:28:25,679 --> 00:28:27,039
uh whereas

714
00:28:27,039 --> 00:28:28,720
what's much more likely to ha well

715
00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:31,200
that's where that feature would get used

716
00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:33,120
much more likely much more often would

717
00:28:33,120 --> 00:28:35,679
be when you're going to apply for a job

718
00:28:35,679 --> 00:28:37,600
because an hr person

719
00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:40,080
generally prefers people to already have

720
00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:41,039
jobs

721
00:28:41,039 --> 00:28:43,039
and so they'll just filter everybody

722
00:28:43,039 --> 00:28:45,120
because that's how bureaucracy sometimes

723
00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:47,360
work and if you if you go through all of

724
00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,320
their use cases like you can pretty much

725
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:51,679
just flip it on its head and say how can

726
00:28:51,679 --> 00:28:53,600
this beam is used and pretty much all of

727
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,840
the attribute use cases can be misused

728
00:28:56,840 --> 00:28:58,480
so

729
00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:00,480
my general feeling

730
00:29:00,480 --> 00:29:01,600
is so

731
00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:03,840
the main so the question for apologies

732
00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:05,200
for this not being a question but the

733
00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:06,640
question part of this is have you looked

734
00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:08,320
at brian ford's proof of personhood

735
00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:10,399
parties because

736
00:29:10,399 --> 00:29:13,279
the in brian ford's model there are no

737
00:29:13,279 --> 00:29:16,799
attributes that's just you have um it's

738
00:29:16,799 --> 00:29:18,000
a function

739
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,279
that maps uh a context to unique

740
00:29:21,279 --> 00:29:22,640
identity

741
00:29:22,640 --> 00:29:24,799
and so then there's no there's no

742
00:29:24,799 --> 00:29:26,880
there's no need for uh

743
00:29:26,880 --> 00:29:28,559
or then we have no attributes we just

744
00:29:28,559 --> 00:29:31,200
have um in a given context i have a

745
00:29:31,200 --> 00:29:32,559
unique

746
00:29:32,559 --> 00:29:34,320
identity and then i have another one and

747
00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:37,760
another identity and there's no

748
00:29:37,760 --> 00:29:40,240
uh so yeah you mean you get the identity

749
00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:42,720
from the government for instance right

750
00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:43,520
which

751
00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:47,279
which has some unique identifier

752
00:29:47,279 --> 00:29:50,880
um in his model uh so he's has this

753
00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:52,640
anarchisty thing essentially they want

754
00:29:52,640 --> 00:29:54,880
this proof of personhood parties where

755
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:55,760
people

756
00:29:55,760 --> 00:29:56,720
produce

757
00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:58,399
but de facto the proof of personhood

758
00:29:58,399 --> 00:30:00,399
parties are a side government so yes

759
00:30:00,399 --> 00:30:02,000
it's coming from a government

760
00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:04,240
but it's not the government it's this

761
00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:06,640
like anarchist construct but you could

762
00:30:06,640 --> 00:30:10,320
do it issued by a government too

763
00:30:11,630 --> 00:30:13,279
[Music]

764
00:30:13,279 --> 00:30:14,399
so yeah

765
00:30:14,399 --> 00:30:15,919
i don't really understand it correctly

766
00:30:15,919 --> 00:30:17,360
yet yeah

767
00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:18,799
like

768
00:30:18,799 --> 00:30:22,320
yeah maybe you'll talk after yeah

769
00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:25,840
and time is up sorry but he will be

770
00:30:25,840 --> 00:30:28,159
available afterwards i'm sure

771
00:30:28,159 --> 00:30:29,360
and

772
00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:31,039
thank you very much for the talk i think

773
00:30:31,039 --> 00:30:32,720
you were the first person who tripled

774
00:30:32,720 --> 00:30:35,120
the audience during talking so please

775
00:30:35,120 --> 00:30:36,960
give him a round of applause for just at

776
00:30:36,960 --> 00:30:38,399
least triple

777
00:30:38,399 --> 00:30:41,639
two before