

# The Listening

**Email Client Backdoor** 

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#### Introduction



- This presentation will focus on a backdoor implementation based on Thunderbird 3.x
- Different approach taking advantage of the addon/extension features
- · How to make it persistant and hide the C&C by using steganography

#### Demo



How cool is this presentation? It is starting with a demo:)



#### How all this started

- Never leave the office without locking your session - FAIL!
- · Malicious Brainstorming ...






## Adapting the idea

- · Web Browsers are commonly targeted
- · But Email Clients are not
- Why not using this as a real backdoor?





## The challenge


- · Targets go on and off
- · Covertness without losing reliability
- · Routing the data
- Stealthiness
- · Resistance to traffic analysis
- · No suspicious open ports
- · Avoid antiviruses & scanners
- · Thinking of future trojans





# Why an email client

Don't you use one? Is it Thunderbird?










#### **Email Client Extensions**



- · Only Thunderbird 3.x for now
  - · multiplatform backdoor out of the box
- · Trusted code
- · Full access to all client functions
- · Program execution
- · Easy development
- · Solve us part of the challenge











#### **Features**

- · Doesn't require user interaction
- · Hidden C&C using steganography on images
- · Encryption using public & private key
- · Processes every email that arrives to the client
- · Predefined Actions
- · Command execution with output retrieval



#### Mozilla Addons/Extensions



```
Basic structure:

/components/*


/content or /chrome/content

/defaults/preferences/*.js

/chrome.manifest

/install.rdf
```






## Development

- · "Must have" tools
  - · Firebug + ChromeBug
  - · Chrome List
  - Console2
  - · DOM Inspector
  - · Event Spy


- · Extension Developer
- · Extension Manager Extended
- · Inspector Widget
- · MozRepl
- XPCOMViewer






#### **How it works**






#### **Email Check**



- Listener on notification service Components.classes["@mozilla.org/messenger/msgnotificationservice;1"]; notificationService.addListener(this, notificationService.msgsClassified);
- · Our method gets called with each new email
- · Filter messages by checking attachments

"attachment.contentType.match(/image\/png/) != null"

## **Encryption**




- · Private & Public key algorithm (PGP)
- · Used to send commands & output
- · Implementation in Javascript
- · Wrapper around gnupg in Python




# **Hiding Information**

- Steganography on images to hide the info
- Who applies steganalysis on every image attached on an email?
- · Common approach is to avoid external images from loading



# **Hiding Information**

· Least Significant Bit (LSB) algorithm



- · We need 3 pixels per byte to hide
- If image is greyscale we could use more than 1 bit per pixel

# **Hiding Information**

- · Python Implementation
  - · Using Python Imaging Library (PIL)
  - · Some bitwise operations and we are ready
- · Javascript Implementation
  - · Hidden iframe to create a HTML5 canvas element
  - · Retrieve pixel info with:

```
var context = canvas.getContext('2d');
var data = context.getImageData(0,0,canvas.width,canvas.height);
```

#### **Execution**




· Using XPCOM interfaces nsIProcess or nsIProcess2

- · Fix arguments to redirect output to temp file
- · Read temp file and then delete it

## **Getting Output**

- 1) XMLHttpRequest
- 2) Sending an email
  - · New email:
    - Components.classes["@mozilla.org/messengercompose;1"]
      Components.classes["@mozilla.org/messenger/account-manager;1"]
  - · Send it:
    - Components.classes["@mozilla.org/messengercompose/compose;1"]
  - · Delete it from sent folder





## Deployment

- · Discover profiles by reading profiles.ini:
  - Windows, usually in %AppData% \Thunderbird\
  - Linux, usually in ~/.thunderbird/ or ~/.mozilla-thunderbird/
  - Mac OS X, usually in ~/Library/Thunderbird/

# Deployment - Injecting Existing Addon



- 1) Installed addons in "profile-dir"/extensions.ini
- 2) Copy backdoor into "selected-addon"/content/
- 3) Edit chrome manifest

```
overlay chrome://messenger/content/messenger.xulchrome://selected-addon/content/backdooroverlay.xul
```

- · Hard to detect
- · User trusts installed addons
- · Addon updates are a problem

# **Deployment - New Addon**

- 1) Copy backdoor into TB extensions folder
- 2) Create a file with random name (an uuid)
- 3) write the path to backdoor folder
- May be easily detected by looking a the Extensions Manager
- · But we can use a trick to hide it

## EVIL BACKDOOR INSTALLED



I NOW CONTROLZ YOUR COMPUTER

## **Deployment alternatives**

- Install Manifest (install.rdf)
   <em:updateURL>
   <em:updateKey>
- · Mozilla Addons Updates
  - Update manifest retrieved in a secure fashion Through SSL Signed Update Manifests
  - 2) Update package retrieved matches Through SSL File Hashes
- Publishing on Mozilla Addon Site (AMO)
   Policies & Review Process
   Sandbox then public
   Blocklist





## **Deployment alternatives**

- · MITM to deliver fake updates
- · (P) Owning widely used addon sites (?)
- · Become a reviewer for a long time (?)
- · Using Mozilla cert to sign updates #comodogate : P
- Zamboni project (new AMO site)
   Source code available
  - https://github.com/jbalogh/zamboni
  - https://github.com/mozilla/zamboni


Audit the code and test you said?

Master visible on https://preview.addons.mozilla.org


Next branch visible on https://next.addons.mozilla.org

## **Avoiding detection**

- · <em:hidden> deprecated since Gecko 1.9.2
- · Hooking Extensions Manager
  - Overlay for chrome://mozapps/content/extensions/extensions.xul
  - Some javascript code to filter our extension
     chrome://mozapps/content/extensions/extensions.js



# **Avoiding detection**



- Skip updates by editing install.rdf file: <a href="mailto:cem:updateURL">cem:updateURL</a>> FAKE URL HERE</em:updateURL>
  This url could also be used to update our backdoor
- · Disabling extensions updates globaly:
  - · extensions.update.enabled
  - · extensions.update.interval
  - · extensions.update.url




# **Capabilities Demo**





## **Getting PGP Information**



- · Enigmail Addon commonly used
- · Hook "enigMessageDecrypt"
- · Prompt for passphrase twice
- EnigGetSecretKeys & enigmailSvc.extractKey FTW
- Match passphrase with ID




### **Improvements**

- · Better steganography algorithms
- · Unicode steganography
- · Inject all addons
- · More methods to get output



#### **Alternative uses**




· Building a SPAM controlled botnet

• others?



#### Conclusion




- · Complete SDK to develop
- · Global scope useful for us
- · Multiplatform backdoor
- · Hijacked extensions are hard to detect
- · Execution with common user but ...
- · Further research on other email clients

#### **Reference & Similar work**



- · Mozilla Develper Network
- · mozillazine KB & Forum
- · StackOverflow questions
- · Immunity PINK Framework
- · Abusing Firefox Addons at Defcon17
- · Digninja twitter botnet (unicode steg)
- · IronGeek steg botnet

#### The End



Thank you for your time

Questions?

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