[Music]
[Applause]
[Music]
ladies and gentlemen
please welcome the moderator of one of
the last sessions of globsec 2021
emily tamkin
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hello everyone uh last afternoon here at
globe sec we are in the home stretch
and thank you for being with us um we
know that there are other events going
on we appreciate you being here
uh this is only a 50-minute panel which
is not very much time to discuss
great power competition in east asia the
subject of this discussion
um so we are going to keep it
conversational
lively and it's meant to be a discussion
so please do
join in there will be an opportunity to
ask questions either here in this room
we have zoom questions and there is uh
you can obviously submit them through
the globesec app
to start out i'm going to introduce our
distinguished panelists they need no
introduction but that's my job so here
we go
um there is yasuki nakamaya he is the
state minister of defense joining us
from japan
we have bruno masiach here in person he
is
a senior research associate at the
wilford martin center for european
studies
from my city dc we have tori tasig
she is a non-resident fellow at
brookings and then we have here
kingo bruginska a policy director at the
center for global europe at glebsec
thank you all so much for being with me
today bruno i want to start with you
so i will um you know before we get into
this discussion
which assumes that there is great power
competition i've had
some discussions with people outside of
the united states who say
there is no great power competition this
is a
framing invented by the americans to
justify opposition to china
to keep themselves relevant in the world
etc what do you make of that
well you you could make that argument uh
i think uh
the idea of great power competition is
is very popular outside the u.s actually
it's very popular in moscow for example
it seems to refer to the idea that
there are different polls of power in
fact when i listen to president biden
these days it seems
to me that he's abandoning a bit the
notion of great power competition he's
going back to an older notion of a
global liberal order
and the power is rooted in the global
liberal order the united states
stands as a kind of enforcer of that
order
but when we talked about great power
competition in in in the latest
administration and the strategy papers
that came out
the notion was that the global liberal
order had eroded
and we were a bit back in the jungle
with different polls of power
and a certain uncertainty about
the number of those powers we knew that
china the united states but then the
questions whether the european union was
part of it
questions whether india could could rise
to that position and
questions about whether russia had a
role to play in this great power
competition
but clearly to me the idea of great
power competition means
that each of these poles has its own
ideological model
each of these poles has its own center
of power
is self-sufficient in some sense and so
the question is
is this really the case or should we
still
think that something like a global order
still exists
and still provide stability uh and you
know for some people
uh it was it was just trump that didn't
believe in the global liberal order but
it's still solid and for others
that order no longer makes sense it's
impossible to enforce
how do we enforce something against
china and i guess that's the question
that
the by the administration will have to
answer how do we enforce something
against russia how do you enforce
something against
against china right now we see that
there's powers of enforcement being
quite weak
well this is actually related to our
poll question which is
what percentage of central and eastern
europeans is worried about china's
rising economic power
so if you have the globe sec app you can
respond to this poll
and we will read out the answers at the
end
um i want to go now to
minister nakayama firstly i apologize
for mispronouncing your last name
in the opening remarks second of all
could you i mean this is about great
power competition in east asia
you are the only participant who is in
east asia can you give us the view from
japan
okay thank you very much uh my japanese
name is so complicated always
so uh this is not your fault thank you
anyway
so nice meeting you i'm from japan
and uh i i am living
just uh right in front of china
and uh i know that uh they are communist
uh
you know the ruling party is a communist
party and uh
you know in 1997 uh as you can see
what's what's what's going on at the
hong kong issue
or the human rights in wiggle or the
another issue about the you know ai like
i mean ai is it's actually that there is
a two meanings
for china one ai is an artificial island
the other ai is artificial intelligence
so they
so the uh lots of dimensions uh what we
have to discuss about
but uh unfortunately the uh the china
held the national people's congress in
march
and announced that the its difference
budget for
uh fiscal year 2021 was a
appropriate approximately u.s dollar to
202 billion uh represented uh growth
about a program is appropriate symmetry
6.8
uh compared to the previous fiscal year
so the the china uh even the
after corona uh they are increasing the
budget for the military and uh so
especially we are really concerned about
the
china between taiwan there is a
taiwan strike we have a concern about
the day before yesterday the chinese air
force
uh invaded uh to the taiwanese
uh territory territorial you know the
sky uh above taiwan so
those kind of uh uh very uh
uh naughty activity by chinese pla
uh towards taiwan it's now uh
increasing the numbers of the the time
so
uh and also uh when you focus to the uh
that's east town east east china sea
and south china sea uh i brought
like this uh photograph from the
satellite uh
this this uh this at shell island used
to be
just a leaf you know very
good it's a very natural reef
but within two three years
made a very very long runway with a
military base
so you can see more uh close to uh
four kilometers runway in
in this shell island so
the the lots of european countries uh
coming towards the uh south china sea
right now
and also the us military forces uh
concerned about the area uh
we are talking uh about and uh
today i'm really glad that uh joining
this forum but
this forum actually held in europe
and now that all now the people who
talking about this issue
is uh came from the united states
uh which we our allies and uh
i'd like to say and to mention that uh
the globe is a it's around and the
internet
also there is no border in this century
so we have to talk not just
not just the trans-trans-atlantic
relationship
but we also have to talk about the asia
issue
because that this taiwan strait issue
is going to be relate to the all whole
nations
so thank you very much thank you um a
lot to impact there that we're going to
come back to throughout this discussion
but right now i want to talk about you
know minister you mentioned this
military conflict but there's also
a a political conflict right or what
what kind of governance systems are we
going to live under
um troy you wrote a piece just
recently that basically said that um
you know countries that are standing up
to china and i apologize if i'm
summarizing it incorrectly you couldn't
you can push back but basically the
countries that are standing up to china
can
can do so democratically right can
bolster the democratic institutions
and that this will be an effective way
to counter china but
you know in the united states whether or
not you protect voting rights has become
a partisan issue
there are examples throughout europe of
uh
democratic backsliding or whatever
phrase you want to use to describe it so
my question is
how can these countries that are
democratic and are
standing up to china how can they say
they're doing that for democracy
when democracy is not being taken care
of at home
big question uh first emily thank you
for
for introducing this this panel it's
nice to be with everyone
here today albeit virtually uh emily i
think your framing
is right so if we take a step back and
look at how the bind administration
is crafting its early world view i would
say
to start it was interesting to me that
in the interim national security
guidance
there actually was no reference to great
power competition
i think there are a number of reasons
for that one is because
russia and china are not seen on the
same level of strategic competition
i think that makes sense but more
broadly
the the framing for this
administration's foreign policy agenda
is in a global competition
between authoritarian and democratic
states
china is clearly a central feature of
that
but another central feature of that is
that the united states seeks to rally
the world's democracies to take on
significant transnational challenges
whether that be
china climate change recovering from the
global pandemic
and i think that's what we saw the
president do on
this uh international trip to europe
which is just wrapping up he wants to
show that america is back
but that it is capable of rallying the
world's democracy democracies
so yes you bring up a key tension that
some of the world's strongest industrial
democracies are backsliding
internally on number of metrics i think
the administration recognizes that
and seeks to strengthen our internal
foundations
whether that be on voting rights uh but
also just presenting a strong democratic
model for the world
and this is going to be a big challenge
for the u.s europe
european and asian democracies to
present
a strong uh internal model so that we
can take on critical transnational
challenges together
um to close i think you bring up an
important tension but it is one that is
acknowledged in
um this administration's approach to its
european and its
asian democratic partners
thank you so much kanga i'd like to
bring you in here um you
also recently have a report out could
you tell us a bit about that
and what your you know your conclusions
are about the current state of great
power
competition thank you very much emily
and and uh welcome
everyone um i wanted to build up and
actually i think bruno and
torres remarks about building a
democratic alternative uh has uh uh also
nicely uh um sums up or it was also
discussed during the g7
g7 summit uh recently uh where
where president biden also mentioned
that there needs
to be a new initiative and we also heard
in the past about the
d10 summit that is in the making
and we we will see what happens i think
the important of course the competition
is going on but but despite and
regardless the new initiatives
the most important part of it is that
they deliver and they bring
tangible results because we've seen many
initiatives
there's a community of democracies there
are different
institutions that uh their mission is to
some more support democracies um abroad
but if they don't deliver then the uh
the effects might be actually bring some
negative uh effects there was also an
initiative of
building back a better word that was
announced as well and
some people liked the slogan so much
they adopted it for themselves
exactly exactly so we will see but it's
a it's a great time it's a good momentum
and it's good to see
that america is back as well and
i think both uh america and the europe
needs each other to
to work on on issues even though they
don't agree
on on everything on on global powers
such as
such as china i have a follow-up which
is you know you just said america is
back
biden himself has repeatedly said
america is back um
but we still have a highly polarized
country we have midterms in 2022
presidential election 2024. um is there
a sense
in in europe particularly in this part
of europe that
okay baden's back he's saying the right
things but it could be reversed like
that
and in the meantime we've gotten
increasingly adversarial toward russia
into china
yeah i think you are right there is a
feeling that that america is back
but there is also understanding that is
this is not the same america that
we used to see but especially if we are
talking about this region
uh this region has never been
left america from its orbit for example
you we you mentioned our report we just
published a report on
strategic autonomy from central and
eastern
european view or perspectives it's it's
not a report that has a
country chapters but rather we brought
together outers from the region to
discuss the topic
and and this topic was was uh strategic
autonomy discussions in europe has
started
way before the uh pandemic
but the all the authors for example say
that
regardless we want or not the the
strategic autonomy of some sorts will
uh will be uh with us
in the medium or uh long term but of
course the devil lies in the details and
also what
every single author of this report said
that
yes central europe would not oppose it
but it
must not lead into the coupling and the
transatlantic bond is something that
that is important for this region and uh
and this is the the whole premise um
bruno a question for you
you know with great power competition
it's it's easy to see what this means
well maybe not easy but it's clearer or
easier to see what this means for the
united states for russia for china for
japan for india
um is there concern that for
smaller countries say in europe or
around the world that they
get left behind and lost in the shuffle
of between the great powers
it's a big concern for for lots of
medium-sized powers
i get that question all the time can a
country
uh afford not to choose you know
singapore would probably not like to be
forced to choose
necessarily in all dimensions between
china and the united states as
strong economic links um
there are other countries who who are
forced
in a way to to pick a side and that was
the story in the cold war i'm not sure
it's going to be the story here
i see opportunities for countries to
play both sides and some are trying that
when it comes to europe name names uh
sorry
well you know some very successful
countries
have developed close ties with china
even in europe switzerland is a good
case switzerland has a free trade
agreement with china and they seem to be
happy with it
um they don't have the same and you know
they have a history of neutrality that
allows them
not to be necessarily forced to align
with the united states on everything
they can say no now the question is is
this going to be
in the end successful or not or in the
end they're going to be forced to choose
when it comes to europe i remember
meeting minister nakayam in 2015
and he was always insisting i think also
with other
european counterparts that europe has to
wake up
and the question which he referred to
today as well is you know the economic
links particularly between east asia and
europe
japan south korea taiwan
are they going to be controlled by china
in the end
are those trade routes going to be
controlled by china the ports the
massive ports that are being constructed
freedom of navigation
this is an issue where europe has to be
very very
active we cannot afford to become
a fortress isolated from the world
so the idea that in a way we have to be
present in asia
is becoming recognized in brussels
you have some european countries
developing indo-pacific strategies
you have the european commission having
two years ago
a big summit with the prime minister
chinzo abe
ideas to do the same with india so i
think i think minister nakayama was
right back then in 2015 this is an issue
also for europe
and we have to be present in in asia
well so i'd like to go now to minister
nakayama and ask
do you think that europe and the rest of
the world have woken up
um if so when did they wake up and why
and if not kind of what is it going to
take
so what the japan hopes now
to maintain and uh reinforce the vision
of voip is to further develop our
relationship
with the european union as a
strategic partner that we can act
together
with to establish world peace and
security and stability
based on common values such as democracy
and rule of law
and principles and uh you know we can
make a promise
and uh but the some country
uh sometimes uh
break the rules so
we are democratic countries uh have to
unite
and uh we need uh
add more friends to make a strong strong
strengthening
uh after against uh
the uh uh you know give the bad
influence to their uh neighboring
country
or even uh not neighboring country
because uh now the time uh you can
attack
uh even not geopolitically close
you can attack another country
through the internet or cyber attacks
so um our friends and the needs
is uh you know all over the world
so the bruno said uh
we have to wake up means uh we have to
wake up now
and when when 2015 i was a
state minister for foreign affairs and i
attended
all the cyber security conference held
out the europe held at the uh north
america
and uh i felt uh at that time
already uh i feel that the
new cold war exists in cyberspace
so that means russia and china
already collaborate collaborating on the
cyber
cyber world and united states and japan
uh is you know collaborating
and uh the internet field for china
chinese and the russians i think that
they wants to control
everything but for the united states and
japan
uh country like japan we want to use
internet field to emphasize the economy
to make more strong and free economy
so i hope the new president of the
united states
uh mr joe biden uh become
uh strong to make a strong leadership to
the democratic
uh nations and
to call upon the uh everybody get
together
to to how to say to to
to protect the uh democratic uh
world and uh not just the chasing
between the communist country
but also we have to
bring them uh bring them into the
uh the the stage
that we can talk more freely
and also talk more honestly
thank you thank you um i have one last
question that i'm going to put to tori
before opening it up to audience
questions again we have zoom questions
you can ask via the app and if you're
here with me in this room we have a
microphone
that you can get up to and ask we just
ask that you please not touch the mic
as we are still in a global pandemic um
tori my question for you you know so
we have this great power competition
right we're we're in this adversarial
relationship
on the other hand we have issues like
the global pandemic like climate change
um that we kind of can't address
if we aren't cooperating to some extent
so how do you how do we
balance the two right the reality that
there are these
um you know aggressive
autocratic uh countries that are on the
ascent
like um on the ascent and
on the other hand that there are
existential challenges that we need to
work out right it's a it's a great point
and i'll answer that by picking up on a
thread that
uh bruno raised um which is
in the united states asking allies or
partners to choose between the united
states and china it brings up this idea
of
decoupling that um i think was prominent
during the trump administration but
i'd like to debunk both of those uh
terms before moving on to your to your
question
one i don't think that the united states
uh under the obama administration nor
even under
um the trump administration really was
looking at decoupling
between the west and china the united
states and china as a viable
policy option it is clear that we
operate in an interconnected web of
technologies and economies and that that
is
not possible in today's world the second
idea of asking allies and partners to
choose
i also do not think is on the table in
the blind administration's foreign
policy agenda either
because the united states recognizes
that
many of its allies and partners in
europe and in asia rely
fundamentally on china's economy and
that if we asked allies and partners to
choose we may not like the answer
so i i think there is more complexity
to u.s foreign policy now than to put it
in terms of decoupling and
and asking allies and partners to choose
so i think that that's
an important thread to start from but
another reason that
these are not viable options is emily
because as you mentioned we're dealing
with transnational challenges that
will require cooperation between
democratic and authoritarian partners
and i think that we can look at the the
u.s russia summit that just
concluded to show that um this is
this is possible and that it is um
necessary you know we look at
uh nuclear issues for example being a
transnational challenge that we have to
deal with
the united states and russia i would say
are on a pretty adversarial footing at
the moment
yet uh presidents biden and putin
recognize that as the two world's
largest nuclear powers
we need to have a sense of stability in
this relationship to ensure that
uh peace remains that's one you know we
also have
our you know looking at the relationship
with china it's very clear that we are
going to need to cooperate with china on
big issues like climate change but also
on pandemic recovery addressing the next
pandemic should there ever be one
and that we need to keep uh channels of
dialogue and communication and
engagement open
so that we can deal with these big
transnational challenges like i
mentioned
nuclear issues climate change um
pandemics
this is going to require cooperation and
dialogue with authoritarian states with
peer competitors with adversaries
and i think that that's very much woven
into
the fabric and understanding of this
administration's outlook
right now okay so we have about half the
session left we're going to go to
questions now
um we have one from the app which
reads it's anonymous it reads is
military still the main area of
competition between great powers such as
china and the us or are geoeconomics and
technology
more important in that regard um kinga
because you just have this report on
strategic autonomy come
out i would like you to to take a stab
thank you very much
uh uh emily uh yeah i think it's
definitely the the second one
and uh we we were also discussing and
this is also
i will refer maybe to to the the the
argument that
if europe wakes up or not when it comes
to the global competition but
uh i think it definitely does of course
there is a
uh there is a division between those who
think that
europe uh is you know too slow does not
do enough but
on the other hand i i started just to
write down you know we
what you did in this regard and it's
it's not enough
we all know that member states national
interests are divided there's no
common position on china russia but
there are attempts from this
bureaucratic machine in in brazos
the we have a geopolitical commission
even it probably
expects sets expectations too high to
what it can deliver
but there is a global thinking about it
we have also the new
agenda for multilateralism when the eu
states that
that it will uh that this
pragmatic approach and cooperation and
approach to china
this is something that the eu is also
looking for and and member states are
actually reading for more
interest-driven eu
and also we member states are working on
the strategic compass also to
uh to bring the the positions closer or
that
analyze together different threats uh so
i definitely think that that europe has
has woke up to the geopolitical uh
uh challenges and is seeking for uh
its role on the global stage um
and um and uh yeah it's
it's just uh the time when that you will
will
arrive there um i know we have a zoom
question
so if the producers could could bring us
that query they're not ready yet with
the zoom question but that's fine um
okay does anyone in the room have a
question
okay we have another one from uh the app
which is uh it's a two-parter from
dimitri lokov of the martin center
one will the quad alliance us australia
india japan become more prominent in the
future
and then the second part is japan's view
does the eu recognize the importance of
southeast asia
so i'm going to have tori take the first
one and then we'll go to the minister so
tori um will the quad alliance become
more important in the future do you
think
short answer yes i think we're already
seeing the quad play a pretty prominent
role
in uh the u.s approach to the
indo-pacific currently
the fact that we had the first leaders
meeting of the quad early on in the
biden administration
i think is important i think it will
become an organizing
principle for dealing with challenges
from
china in the region but also um a more
positive and affirmative vision dealing
with vaccine distribution
um there is a i think a working group
for critical and emerging technologies
that is taking place within the quad
format
and uh yes absolutely i think that this
will be a
an important organizing principle for
u.s engagement in the region
i would be curious to hear from our
japanese counterparts whether he sees
um a a concrete real role for the eu
within or european partners within the
quad but on that i'd refer
to my colleague um so let's go now to to
minister
uh nakayama do you think that well first
of all does that you recognize the
importance of southeast asia
and can is there a role for the eu in
the quad
or um i think i i'm so sure that the uh
for example the this april this year
uh you know european union too has
announced
its strategy to cooperate in uh in in
the uh
in the pacific and uh also the uh
what what this strategy uh advocates
is exactly in harmony with what japan
promotes
in the foy vision uh in particular
as defense mini minister i highly
commend uh comment
on the point that the eu strategy
sets out uh the strengthening of uh
presence and action in the in the
pacific
on the related note we are seeing a
closer
collaboration with each of the european
nations
last month we conducted a
multi-racial exercise called arc 21
with france and united states and
australia
uh that involved training um
menus such as relation uh
rep repleni reprehension
at sea ras
and uh landing ashore uh
not only were we able to demonstrate
uh our resolution to protect our
our remote islands but we were
also able to show off our solid
collaboration between japan and france
and the indo-pacific
to our domestic and international
audience
ever as an effort not to lose
uh the moment a momentum of the exercise
each of the each of the chief of staff
from ground
maritime and heir staff officers of his
offices
engaged in vtcs with their france
counterparts and share views regarding
defense cooperation
going forward and also the united
kingdom kingdom uh
is going to send a queen el davis and so
uh
i think and also the germany too so the
all the european union countries
uh really focusing on uh
this region northeast asia and also the
south
south east asia but uh unfortunately
honestly speaking the
the taiwan issue is the i think the more
the most biggest issue and uh in the
pacific ocean
uh we have a honolulu and there is a
in the pacom of the united states
seventh street base
and i think the pacific ocean is very uh
big value and
asset uh for for not just the
asian country but also the indian ocean
countries and
even the europeans if you look up this
map this is a south china sea
and if the chinese submarine
launched the longest distance missile
towards
the north america it already reaches
to the white house and that means whole
the nation
including europe is already
inside of the range of the chinese uh
nuclear weapons it's a it's a
possibility
but uh we we have to unite and uh
uh this issue and the concern
uh we have to talk about uh like this
situation
and uh i don't know about the quad
future
uh but quad it's it's it's kind of like
examples of the how we make good friends
uh which we have a mutual uh profit
for the future and it will so thank you
very much
bruno i'd like to put the same questions
to you but from the european perspective
so
do you think that the eu recognizes uh
the importance of
southeast asia and what is the role for
europe with the quad yes it does
the high representative just came back
from indonesia
there was actually a very good reaction
lots of op-eds in the straits times and
other regional newspapers
the idea again is we have very strong
trade links and economic links but
that's not quite enough
they have to be protected politically
and
perhaps even militarily the issue you
asked this question earlier just a side
note
so far the competition has been mostly
economic and technological
but there's of course a question whether
chinese authorities decide to change the
nature of this competition at some point
by the way finding that competition in
the economic sphere is becoming very
difficult
and therefore then the question of
taiwan and other questions could
could be raised it's possible that china
would divert
great power competition to the military
sphere at some point
that could be the story for the next
decade and there i remain very skeptical
that the european union can do a lot
the question as it's usually posed in in
brussels in washington is
should europe have a military presence
in southeast asia
and south asia or should it focus on
europe therefore
freeing american resources to be more
focused on asia
i think that's a dialogue that's
happening between the united states and
europe
probably what's going to happen maybe
minister nakayama will
disagree but probably what's going to
happen is that europe is going to be
more focused on its eastern borders
european resources are going to be used
to face russia
and that u.s will slowly divert its
attention to
south asia southeast asia uh philippines
uh
let me just finish with one thought
maybe i you won't come back to me
uh it's been interesting this discussion
uh the question of values
because when you talk about great power
competition and during the trump
administration
it seemed to be uh the sort of
leaving behind the values question and
focusing on power
and that's very much a question that is
alive so far the bilingual
administration has really concentrated
its attention on the on democracies
india japan south korea have deserved
prime treatment from the administration
but soon enough
we're going to have a very serious
question whether the united states is
going to engage with vietnam
is going to engage with the philippines
in particular uh of course lots of of
questions about duterte there
uh thailand uh and then uh that raises
the question of
of whether uh values should be the main
consideration or power should be the
main consideration
and i i i personally think that the
united states will be forced sooner or
later
to be a bit more flexible in its
approach if it wants to
balance chinese power in asia
so we have another question this one
comes to us from jack dalrymple
how successful do you think china's belt
and road initiative has been and what do
you think should be europe's response to
these efforts to influence
influence countries kanga i will go to
you
yeah i think we've just seen the the the
response and and the
uh g some g uh seven summit uh
conclusions or recommendations that that
the world is thinking about this
question
and uh and there is a actually
uh really understanding that those
alternatives
must be delivered if uh the the word
uh if democracies want to shape
uh and influence uh the word uh
as well so i think chinese were
very smart in this in this approach with
this initiative and
from their perspective it is um it is
successful uh what it's often also that
this region is criticized for
for the 16 now uh one plus one
summit and uh it comes up in our report
but also discussions that we have in the
region as well is that the
central and eastern european countries
are more and more kind of
disappointed with uh with the the
chinese approach and they often we often
say it's not 16 plus one but one plus 16
because because the states
are aware and and they cannot influence
that match the agenda
the format the setup so so uh
it has been highly criticized but there
is also a reflection in the region that
this is not the format that
for example uh brings that much
to the region and we've seen lithuania
leaving it so
we will see what what happens and how
also this is
integrated on the eu level but
we also know that other member states
also have their different policies
so i wouldn't hear it okay
um we have another anonymous question
this says
economy resources and technology concern
concerns strategic autonomy
how to keep the autonomy economically um
tory i'd like to go back to you because
you spoke earlier about how we're not
act
we're not really going to decouple
economically um
what are your thoughts on this question
how do you how do you remain
economically
autonomous in a great power world
uh big question um and there are a
couple things i'd like to pick up on
from what bruno and
and kanga have said as well but to
address this issue
um you know i think the the best way
for european powers and for the european
union to engage
in what we might call a great game of
great power competition however you want
to phrase it
is through its economic weight and its
regulatory power we haven't really
brought up this idea of regulatory power
yet
and this is where the european union and
the european market
have a tremendous amount of weight on
the world stage and can
influence how companies and powers
engage at home in the world's
largest market um so i think looking
ahead we're going to see the european
commission really lean into that its
economic and its regulatory power
to engage among great powers like the
united states russia and china so that's
one point um i want to go back to uh
the question on bri and development
because
i completely agree with kenya that i
think there's a lot of disappointment
and disillusionment with what china is
offering to
both industrialized and developing
countries in its um
very lone heavy uh model and also
just in the the disappointment around
what china's been able to follow through
on
infrastructure-wise and so i think the
time is right for
industrialized democracies the united
states europe other
countries in the pacific like japan to
really present viable
alternatives to china's bri and honestly
i don't think we're we're there yet
i think you know the the european asian
connectivity strategy
the united states blue dot network
initial development initiatives like
this are not
they don't have the political weight and
the economic investment behind them to
currently present
uh viable alternatives and i really
think we need to lean into
uh the development angle of our
soft power influence around the world so
i think uh development is going to be
critical to
our ability to compete economically with
key regions around the world
now and going forward great so we have
another question this one comes from a
tough
tathova it's a question for minister
nakayama
where do you see the future of eu japan
cooperation what are the areas where it
could be strengthened
minister yes
thank you very much for the question uh
i'd like to say that
you know the for example
think about the chinese activities right
now
uh we are really concerned about uh
unilateral attempts to change the status
quo
and uh but this kind of things
not just happening on the earth but also
the
outer space so uh you know
for example like uh the in the military
field
uh the big countries and uh the
countries who get
lots of budget for the armament they
already created
hgv missiles which is a very high speed
long-range missiles and we cannot
stop those kind of high-speed
very aggressive massive
attacks and if we want to stop
those high technologies we have to
create
and uh pro we have to prepare the
protection of the outer space
but if you look up the sky and see the
outer space
we have a lot of already problem and the
issues
and uh you can see the uh lots of types
of their space and that
the chinese the space agency
already launched lots of kira satellite
and they launched satellite and
after that they destroy their own
satellite
and make lots of state space their leads
also
you can see this graph and that really
includes
increasing the number of the space
stabilities
so why not the european countries
and the japan and united states
collaborating
to protect of the the peace
and stability of the outer space issues
so we have a lot of capabilities and
chances for the future between
collaborating
with european union european countries
and also the united states of america
thank you thank you um you came prepared
you got maps you got charts you got
graphs
um we have a zoom question now so we
will go to that
good afternoon everyone my name is
beatrice i'm from
australia as part of the global voices
program
first of all thank you for such an
informative discussion
that we're having today my question is
um you've mentioned communities of
democracies and it's been mentioned
a couple of times during this week my
question is
would the community of democracy survive
another
administration such as trump given the
recent rise in popular
populism that we've seen
i am going to go to my fellow american
to take beatrice's excellent question
tori thank you beatrice it's a great
question that means
you asked uh president biden i think he
would say that he
ran on the very notion that american
democracy
was fledgling and that it wouldn't
survive the second term of the trump
administration
um but but i think there's a broader
point
um to be addressed here in your question
beatrice and that's
that um democracies are challenged from
within and from without
i think during the trump administration
there was this focus on
um resurgent authoritarianism around the
world and looking
at challenges from russia china iran
north korea is kind of an axis of
authoritarian powers
but there was no recognition um you know
maybe for cynical reasons about
uh declining democracy from within and i
think that notion has been flipped on
its head
in this new administration we recognize
that we have
uh significant uh weaknesses within our
own democracy
not just in the united states but in our
alliances and partnerships around the
world
and that we have to strengthen our
democratic resilience
in order to speak with a collective
voice abroad
um you know we have this summit for
democracy taking place ostensibly in the
next
year or so at some point in 2022 i think
that there are going to be a lot of
issues addressed there uh first and
foremost who goes
um how do we count democracies as
democracies i'm glad i'm not planning
that because i think that would be a
difficult
issue to address but but i do think just
to go back to your question that
there is a recognition that our
democracies have been weakened from
within by
forces of populism nationalism and that
we need to recognize these
internal weaknesses in order to compete
with
authoritarian powers abroad i think
that's two sides of the coin
that really need to be addressed if
we're going to
compete successfully with authoritarian
powers whether that be russia china or
others
thank you so much yes we will see who's
at who is at the summit and
if as bruno suggested at some point
the united states gets more flexible as
to who's allowed in its democratic club
i very quickly we have just a few
minutes left but very quickly i'd like
to put this question
uh to the europeans do you think that
this sort of um
pro-democratic trans-atlantic stance
against
china and russia and great power and in
our great power universe right we've
learned that it's not just the world
it's also in space
um does that survive if if trump or
someone like trump is back in 2024 very
quickly
can i disagree with the question of
course yeah because i you know i think
that's
that's not really the main question for
me the main question is
the rise of china in particular and
the way it's affecting the global system
what we saw
in the last two three years was a kind
of
failure of enforcing global norms
on a scale that we hadn't seen before so
remember when the hong kong protest
started
this educated opinion in in western
uh media and and commentary it was there
is no way that china can respond to this
uh it lost control over hong kong and
that's kind of the reaction we had 20 30
years ago
that an authoritarian state could not
react to such uh widespread protests
because you know the solution was
to bring the military in right and that
would have unintended consequences
well i think you know we've been
learning that things are a bit more
complicated
and that this power of enforcement
coming from global democracies is much
weakened
china was able to control the descent in
hong kong
we see in belarus even more shocking
that a small country like belarus was
able to put an end to the protests
and so really for me the question and
i'm sorry to say this it might not sound
popular
it's actually a question of power
distribution
and the way we have to
martial news sources of power find new
allies
uh if we want to have a a stable global
balance of power
because what's happening it seems clear
to me is that countries like china like
russia are testing the limits and
becoming
increasingly confident that there are no
consequences to a number of actions
navalny is another great example um so
every month uh or every couple of months
we see
how this global order is eroding further
and further
well on that optimistic note let's just
very quickly check in with our poll
results
producers can we see the full there we
go uh no that's
i need to hit poll
we have the question was what percentage
for central central and eastern
europeans is worried about china's
rising economic power
47 no it's roughly 50 50 right i think
if i'm reading that right anyway um in
just a second we will continue in this
very room with a session called
political leadership and climate change
united we stand
so don't go anywhere we'll be back after
a short video but first please join me
in thanking
tori kinga bruno minister nakayama
thank you all so much for being here
today we hope you enjoyed great power
competition
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